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Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) have observed 
an enormous increase in the availability of alcohol 
since the 1980s. There has been huge growth in 
the number and types of places at which alcohol 
can be purchased, and in the times of the day and 
week transactions can take place. Over this period, 
there has also been a substantial increase in alcohol 
purchases for consumption off-premises, a shift partly 
driven by the increasing cost ratio of on- versus off-
premise drinks. The on-premises trade has responded 
by shifting business models. Some adjustments, 
such as increased food offerings, are likely to place 
downward pressure on rates of harm. However, the 
greater competition can also push up rates of harm, 
as marginal operators compete with bulk and cheap 
promotions.
The net result seems to have been relatively stable 
per capita consumption, but an increased awareness 
of harms associated with drinking. The political 
response to increasing public concern has focused 
predominantly on late-night violence and the broad 
notion of community amenity. Cracking down on 
drink driving was an earlier manifestation of this kind 
of response to visible problems involving a large 
number of ambulance attendances and emergency 
department presentations.
Pressure on the political system has produced a 
variety of policies targeting the temporal availability 
of alcohol. The high profile of alcohol-related street 
violence in Australia in particular, has driven restrictions 
on the sale of particular products or in certain forms 
late at night. Both Australia and the UK have initiatives 
attempting to address the cumulative impact of 
licensed businesses to maintain community amenity. 
The UK has also produced schemes such as ‘reducing 
the strength’ to encourage voluntary restrictions on 
particular products.
Political will for meaningful reform has regularly been 
limited by the enormous power and sophisticated 
lobby of the alcohol and hospitality industries. Much of 
the policy debate in Australia has surrounded the late 
night trade of alcohol. With debate focusing on events 
at 4am, it has remained peripheral to the great majority 
of Australians who are in bed at that time. Similarly, 
progress on cumulative and community impact has 
been largely ineffective. Policies have focused on 
whether and where further licences will be issued 
rather than reducing the number of licences, which 
has not been an issue which governments have been 
willing to consider.
The breadth of harm associated with alcohol demands 
targeted measures and consideration of alcohol policy 
across a variety of domains. The multifaceted nature 
of domestic violence and chronic disease, for example, 
mean policies addressing alcohol’s role in these issues 
are both challenging to develop and sometimes 
overlooked. A recurrent surprise has been that a 
relatively strong measure aimed at visible problems on 
the street – for instance, drink driving – unexpectedly 
has an effect in reducing rates of domestic violence. 
FOREWORD
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FOREWORD
Given the strong association between alcohol and 
both the prevalence and magnitude of such issues, 
it is vital that policymakers consider measures 
to regulate the availability of alcohol to lessen 
associated harm.
In this respect, this report highlights areas requiring 
further research to better understand measures to 
address particular harms. For example, although 
separation of liquor in supermarkets tends to be 
viewed as an archaic hangover of a temperance past, 
it may hold promise in reducing harm. At issue is not 
only the problem of impulse purchasing, but also the 
symbolism around whether alcohol is an ordinary 
commodity or a substance susceptible to abuse that 
contributes significantly to harm and suffering of the 
population. Such symbolic issues tend to operate in 
the longer term and are not likely to be measurable 
within the attention span of governments looking for 
quick fixes.
Efforts to recalibrate policy to strike an appropriate 
balance in the availability of alcohol have been 
hindered by strong ties between the alcohol industry 
and the political class. Levels of government also 
differ in their main interests in alcohol issues. Central 
governments tend to get the revenue from taxes, while 
the harm may be most apparent at the local level, 
where local governments often pick up the pieces. 
Many of the policy approaches discussed in this report 
started as inventive attempts by those dealing with 
problems at the local level to find ways of reducing 
harm within the limits of laws or regulations 
imposed by a higher level of government. 
Industry interests make sure these laws and 
regulations protect vested interests so that 
progress is restricted to policies that industry is 
willing to concede. It comes as no surprise, then, 
that responding to alcohol’s proliferation and 
clawing back availability has been a challenging 
task.
This report provides a valuable contribution to 
the literature on policy measures to regulate 
the availability of alcohol. Comparison between 
initiatives applied in Australia and the UK allows 
insight into their relative strengths and the 
identification of opportunities for improvement 
in each country. 
The availability of alcohol is a crucial element 
in what happens with consumption trends and 
with rates of alcohol-related harm. Public policy 
needs to prioritise evidence-based controls on 
the availability of alcohol to reduce rates of harm.
Professor Robin Room
DIRECTOR
CENTRE FOR ALCOHOL POLICY RESEARCH
LA TROBE UNIVERSITY
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GLOSSARY
ACT: Australian Capital Territory, Australia
CIA: Community impact assessment
CIP: Cumulative impact policy
CIS: Community impact statement
EMRO: Early morning restriction order
FARE: Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, Australia
IAS: Institute of Alcohol Studies, United Kingdom
LGA: Local Government Association
LNL: Late night levy
NSW: New South Wales, Australia
NT: Northern Territory, Australia
PCC: Police and Crime Commissioner
PIA: Public interest assessment
RBL: Risk-based licensing
RTS: Reducing the strength schemes
SLP: Statement of licensing policy 
SA: South Australia, Australia
UK: United Kingdom
VCGLR: Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation
WA: Western Australia, Australia
WHO: World Health Organization
FOUNDATION FOR ALCOHOL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION & THE INSTITUTE OF ALCOHOL STUDIES   
7
International evidence consistently points towards the physical, economic, social, and psychological availability 
of alcohol as important mediating variables in the prevalence of alcohol-related harm.1 Commentators have 
highlighted that Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) have similar drinking cultures2 and share commonalities 
in patterns of alcohol harm, particularly in relation to crime and violence.3 While both jurisdictions regulate the 
physical availability of alcohol, to date there has been no comparative analysis of policy approaches to reduce 
alcohol harm in Australia and the UK.
This discussion paper provides an overview of tangible policy options for Australian and UK governments and 
makes recommendations about the use of alcohol availability controls to mitigate harm. Alongside case study 
examples from each jurisdiction, it provides information about the legislative, regulatory, and policy options for 
introducing a range of availability controls. It also assesses political and community appetites for the introduction 
of these measures and, where possible, outlines the resource requirements for implementation. 
A snapshot ‘alcohol availability policy scorecard’ provides an overview of the 14 policies analysed in this report. 
Interventions were scored based on effectiveness in reducing harm and value for money. 
The three highest scoring alcohol policies were:
 ● last drink laws, presently found in New South Wales and Queensland, Australia
 ● statement of licensing policies (SLPs), found across the UK, and
 ● cumulative impact policies (CIPs), used in England and Wales.  
Low scoring policies include alcohol industry voluntary schemes and alcohol industry schemes found in both 
Australia and the UK, and the late night levy operating in England and Wales.
Jurisdictions within each country have also attempted to refocus their licensing laws towards minimising the 
harm alcohol can cause, with Scotland introducing a health objective and ‘harm minimisation’ found in some 
Australian states. While these approaches differ, they have faced similar obstacles and issues. There seems to be 
scope for shared learnings and recommendations on the most effective goals to focus on, evidence to use, and the 
importance of informing decisions with a very close analysis of the issues found in the particular location.
SUMMARY
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Based on the analysis contained within this report, ten recommendations are made. These recommendations 
apply a standard to which all jurisdictions should aim, with some having been achieved to varying degrees in 
regions already.
TEMPORAL POLICIES
1. Restrict trading hours for off-licence liquor
Limit off-licence opening hours to between 10am and 10pm, or similar.
2. Restrict trading hours of on-licence venues to limit the availability of alcohol after midnight
Place appropriate restrictions on the hours at which alcohol may be sold to reduce harm associated with 
late night trade and, to the extent possible, restrict the availability of alcohol after midnight and in the 
early morning hours.
SPATIAL POLICIES
3. Improve regulation of off-licence liquor sales
Confine alcohol to specific areas within supermarkets to discourage impulse purchases and reduce alcohol 
sales.
4. Enhance community involvement
Provide residents with access to legal resources and advice to ensure that the community is able to 
engage with licensing systems.
5. Clearly define licensing policy to minimise the cumulative harm associated with higher densities of  
  liquor outlets
Develop comprehensive policies for how licensing legislation should be implemented, including 
protecting local communities by applying controls on outlet density.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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HARM MINIMISATION
6. Place the onus on applicants to prove that their venue is in the public interest
Reverse the burden of proof in licensing decisions to require applicants to demonstrate that granting of a 
license is in the public interest. 
7. Include and prioritise public health and/or harm minimisation objectives in liquor legislation
Specify in all liquor legislation public health and the minimisation of harm as objectives in the regulation 
of alcohol, including licensing decisions, and ensure they have primacy over other objectives, to empower 
communities and allow governments greater control of outlet density.
8. Enhance data sharing to facilitate more targeted policy interventions 
Collect and share data from hospital emergency departments and police, in a manner consistent with the 
‘Cardiff model’, to inform policy development and improve strategies to reduce alcohol harm.
PRODUCT RESTRICTIONS
9. Restrict the sale of high risk products in areas of concern
Restrict the sale of products susceptible to abuse, on the basis of strength and price, in areas with high 
levels of alcohol harm.
ALCOHOL INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS
10. Deprioritise alcohol industry voluntary schemes
Deprioritise assistance to alcohol industry voluntary schemes, such as liquor accords, in favour of 
evidence-based policies to deliver meaningful reductions in alcohol-related harm.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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International evidence consistently 
points towards the availability of 
alcohol as an important mediating 
variable in the prevalence of 
alcohol-related harm.4 Availability 
theory points to a number of 
interrelating factors that influence 
access to alcohol, including: 
 ● how easy it is to physically 
obtain retail alcohol (physical 
availability)
 ● how affordable alcohol is 
(economic availability)
 ● social norms and provision of 
alcohol via informal means such 
as parties and social gatherings 
(social availability), and 
 ● the perceived availability of 
alcohol, including responses 
to alcohol marketing 
(psychological availability).5
Policy measures targeting the 
physical availability of alcohol 
in particular are one of the 
most effective ways to reduce 
alcohol-related harm.6 The World 
Health Organization (WHO) lists 
interventions that restrict the 
availability of retail alcohol among 
the three ‘best buy’ policies to 
reduce alcohol harm, alongside 
increases in price and bans on 
alcohol advertising.7 Specific 
interventions designed to restrict 
the availability of retail alcohol 
include minimum purchase age 
laws, spatial policies such as controls 
on the number and density of 
alcohol outlets, and temporal 
controls to regulate the days and 
hours of alcohol sale.
While availability measures can 
reduce the harm associated 
with alcohol purchased from 
both on-licence and packaged 
liquor venues, regulation of each 
channel of supply presents distinct 
challenges. On-licence trade refers 
to the consumption of alcohol at 
public venues, including pubs, bars, 
restaurants and nightclubs. It has 
been associated with violence,8,9 
particularly late at night,10 as well as 
sexual assault and a variety of other 
antisocial incidents. Packaged liquor 
is defined in the Liquor Licensing 
Act 1997 (SA) as “liquor in sealed 
containers for consumption off 
licensed premises”. Alcohol sold in 
this manner (sometimes referred to 
as ‘takeaway’ alcohol) accounts for 
80 per cent of all alcohol consumed 
in Australia.11 In England, 65 per cent 
of alcohol is sold in the off-licensed 
trade.12 Packaged liquor, which is 
predominantly consumed in private 
venues, contributes to similar harms 
to that supplied on-premises. 
However, the context means 
the specific nature of the harm 
is different. For example, alcohol 
consumed in a private residence 
is likely to contribute to a greater 
proportion of domestic violence 
incidents13 and child maltreatment 
and neglect.14 For this reason, while 
similar theoretical frameworks (such 
reduced availability) apply, the 
specific policy measures to reduce 
harm resulting from packaged/off-
licence and on-licence alcohol sales 
are different.
Commentators have highlighted 
that Australia and the United 
Kingdom (UK) have similar drinking 
cultures15 and share commonalities 
in patterns of alcohol harm, 
particularly in relation to crime 
and violence.16 From a policy 
perspective, both jurisdictions 
adopt licensing frameworks that 
regulate the physical availability of 
alcohol, but to date, there has been 
no comparative analysis of policy 
options to reduce the harms from 
alcohol in Australia and the UK.
In Australia, recent policy changes 
targeting the availability of alcohol 
have largely been temporal. 
These include the introduction 
of restrictions on trading hours 
for on-premise venues in the 
city of Newcastle to 3.30am, the 
introduction of last drinks from 3am 
in Sydney’s CBD, and a state-wide 
10pm close for takeaway alcohol for 
all New South Wales. More recently, 
the Queensland Government 
passed legislation to introduce 
state-wide 2am last drinks from 1 
July 2016, with venues inside zoned 
‘Safe Night Precincts’ permitted to 
trade until 3am.
In the UK, policy changes following 
the introduction of 24-hour 
licensing in 2005 have largely 
focused on spatial restrictions and 
concerns around outlet density. This 
includes cumulative impact policies 
designed to restrict the growth 
of groups of licensed premises 
in particular areas of saturation. 
However, questions remain as to 
whether these spatial restrictions 
in the UK have worked as intended. 
Attempts have been made to limit 
closing times in areas with acute 
problems, through the late night 
levy and early morning restriction 
order, although these policies have 
also proven largely ineffective. 
There are lessons to be learnt from 
INTRODUCTION
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the respective experiences of 
Australia and the UK in reforming 
and imposing alcohol availability 
controls to reduce and prevent 
harm. This discussion paper 
provides an overview of tangible 
policy options for the Australian 
and UK Governments and makes 
recommendations about the use 
of alcohol availability controls to 
mitigate harm. Alongside case study 
examples from each jurisdiction, 
it provides information about the 
legislative, regulatory, and policy 
options for introducing a range of 
availability controls. It also assesses 
political and community appetites 
for these measures and, where 
possible, outlines the resource 
requirements for implementation. 
The objective of this report is 
to explore how countries faced 
with similar challenges relating to 
alcohol have approached evidence-
based policies to reduce harm. In 
particular, policy approaches are 
identified and evaluated based 
on their effectiveness in reducing 
harm, value for money, and 
political support. Consideration 
of these factors provides a holistic 
perspective and aims to inform 
the development of policy that 
This report provides a stocktake 
of policy approaches employed 
in Australia and the UK that 
have involved regulation of the 
availability of alcohol. Policy 
measures were identified by subject 
matter experts and include both 
current and past initiatives. The 
report sought to present a relatively 
equal balance of Australian and UK 
policies. Specific case studies are 
presented from each country and 
are followed by a discussion of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses 
of each approach. The information 
presented in case studies and 
discussion sections then form 
the basis for development of 
a scorecard comparing policy 
measures on several dimensions.
Policy measures were grouped by 
category areas, which included 
temporal policies, spatial policies, 
harm minimisation and use of data, 
and product restrictions. Temporal 
policies include those that were 
designed to regulate the availability 
of alcohol over time, such as 
late night levies and last drink 
policies. Spatial policies involve 
the regulation of outlet density by 
geographic region or the placement 
of alcohol in stores. Examples of 
such policies include cumulative 
impact policies and separation 
of liquor aisles in supermarkets. 
Harm minimisation and use of data 
represented another category, 
and review the use of particular 
objects in Liquor Acts, as well as 
data collection and use of evidence 
in licensing decisions. Finally, 
product restriction policies focus on 
initiatives that have restricted the 
sale of particular alcoholic beverage 
classes in specified regions or 
during defined periods. 
The case studies identify evidence 
of impact of policy measures, their 
resource requirements, political 
support (or opposition), and the 
policy mechanisms through which 
they take effect. The report draws 
on the best available evidence on 
the impact of policy measures. 
Where possible, this includes 
peer-reviewed research. Naturally, 
there is a considerable degree of 
variation in the amount and quality 
of research evaluating different 
policy approaches. Similarly, 
attempts were made to obtain 
accurate indications of the resource 
requirements for each policy 
approach. Discussion of resource 
requirements relied on both 
demonstrated costs and benefits, as 
well as the theoretical implications 
(for example, whether the policy 
is likely to generate additional 
revenue or would come at a net 
cost). Evaluation of political support 
typically drew heavily on media 
coverage, including statements 
from proponents and opponents to 
the various approaches, as well as 
statements made by government in 
policy documents and parliament. 
Case studies also identified the 
mechanism through which policies 
took effect (whether legislative, 
regulatory or otherwise).
may deliver reductions in harm 
and expenditure with the least 
resistance. The exchange of 
information and sharing of best 
practice between the Member 
States is cited in the WHO global 
strategy as crucial to the reduction 
of harmful use worldwide.17 As 
non-government organisations, the 
Foundation for Alcohol Research 
and Education (FARE) and the 
Institute of Alcohol Studies (IAS) 
share the same goal to advocate for 
evidence-based policies to reduce 
alcohol harm.
APPROACH
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SCORE EVIDENCE OF IMPACT RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS
POLICY MECHANISMS 
AVAILABLE FOR 
INTRODUCTION
1
Limited evidence of 
effectiveness in reducing 
alcohol harm
Highly resource intensive to 
implement
No policy mechanisms 
currently available for 
introduction
2
Some evidence of 
effectiveness, though limited 
with respect to robustness of 
evidence or scale of reduction 
in harm
Moderately resource intensive 
to implement
Policy mechanisms 
available but current local 
implementation issues
3
Strong evidence that the 
measure is effective in 
reducing alcohol harm
Low resource intensity to 
implement
Policy mechanisms available 
with minimal implementation 
issues
The scorecard was developed based on details presented within each case study, as well as discussions contrasting 
policy measures. Each policy was rated according to its evidence of impact, partly based on the framework 
developed by Babor et al. (2010).18 Scores were awarded across four measures of performance, including evidence 
of impact, resource implications, political support, and mechanisms available for the introduction of the policy. On 
each indicator, a score between one and three was awarded (with higher scores reflecting better performance). 
Policies were awarded aggregated scores out of nine (three domains marked out of three), with higher scores 
reflecting stronger performance and a score of three as the lowest level. A rubric outlining the scores awarded is 
provided below.
SCORECARD EXPLAINED
FOUNDATION FOR ALCOHOL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION & THE INSTITUTE OF ALCOHOL STUDIES   
13
Region 
implemented 
(AUS/UK) 
Evidence of 
impact in 
reducing harms
(3 = stronger 
evidence)
Resource 
implications for 
public sector
(3 = less 
resource 
intensive)
Policy 
mechanisms 
available for 
introduction
(3 = easy 
introduction)
Total score
(3 = lowest 
to 
9 = highest)
Temporal policies 
Last drinks Australia 3 3 2 8
Late night levies England and Wales 1 1 2 4
Risk-based licensing Australia 1 3 3 7
Spatial policies
Cumulative impact 
policies
England and 
Wales 2 2 3 7
Statements of 
licensing policy
England, Wales 
and Scotland 2 2 3 7
Separate liquor aisles Australia 1 3 2 6
Community impact 
assessment Australia 1 2 2 5
Harm minimisation and use of data
Public health 
licensing objective Scotland 2 1 2 5
Harm minimisation as 
primary object Australia 2 1 3 6
Anonymous data 
sharing: the Cardiff 
model
England and 
Wales 3 1 2 6
Product restriction policies
Restrictions on 
purchase of certain 
products
Australia 2 2 2 6
Reducing the 
strength schemes
England and 
Wales 2 1 2 5
Alcohol industry voluntary schemes
Alcohol industry 
voluntary schemes
England, Wales 
and Scotland 1 1 2 4
Liquor accords Australia 1 1 2 4
ALCOHOL AVAILABILITY POLICY SCORECARD
TEMPORAL
POLICIES
COMPARING AND DISCUSSING:
LAST DRINKS POLICIES
LATE NIGHT LEVIES
RISK-BASED LICENSING
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Policies that restrict the time 
when alcohol can be sold at on-
premises venues in the evening 
or early hours of the morning are 
often referred to as ‘last drinks’. 
Under such schemes, licensed 
premises are often allowed to 
remain open after last drinks 
but are unable to serve alcohol 
past that time. Last drinks 
policies have been implemented 
in New South Wales (NSW) in 
the Kings Cross and Sydney 
CBD Entertainment precincts 
since February 2014, and were 
implemented in Queensland 
from 1 July 2016. 
Last drinks policies have typically 
been introduced in conjunction 
with other measures, including 
one-way doors. A one-way 
door, or ‘lockout’, restricts new 
patrons from entering a venue 
after a specified time. Patrons 
already inside the venue may 
continue to purchase and 
consume alcohol until the venue 
closes. In public debate, the 
lockout and last drinks measures 
have often been referred to 
collectively as ‘lockouts’ or 
‘lockout laws’. However, the 
measures are fundamentally 
different and must be evaluated 
separately. Discussion here 
focuses exclusively on last 
drinks, although their individual 
effects are sometimes difficult to 
distinguish as they have regularly 
been introduced simultaneously. 
Last drinks have more formally 
been called the ‘liquor sales 
cessation period’ in the Liquor 
Regulation 2008 (NSW), referring 
to the period on any day of the 
week between 3am and the 
commencement of the standard 
trading period. The licence 
condition means that liquor 
must not be sold or supplied on 
the premises in that period. This 
does not prevent the continued 
provision of other services 
such as food and non-alcoholic 
beverages, entertainment and 
the use of the premises for 
conferences or meetings, and 
for gambling activities that are 
otherwise permitted.
In early 2016, the Queensland 
Government passed the 
Tackling Alcohol-Fuelled Violence 
Legislation Amendment Act 2016. 
From 1 July 2016, the service 
of alcohol in licensed premises 
in Queensland was restricted 
beyond 2am. Venues can only 
remain open beyond 2am 
to serve food, non-alcoholic 
beverages, and to provide 
entertainment. Last drinks do 
not apply to casinos, licensed 
premises in airports and 
industrial canteens, services clubs 
on Anzac Day and certain other 
venues. With many exemptions 
applied under the Queensland 
scheme, it remains to be seen 
whether the measures will deliver 
the level of harm reduction that 
would otherwise be expected.
Late-trading venues located 
in Safe Night Precincts (SNPs) 
will be able to sell alcohol until 
3am. Under the Queensland 
Government’s Safe Night Out 
Strategy (SNOS), these precincts 
have been established to ensure 
effective local management of 
key entertainment areas. Safe 
Night Precincts are managed 
by local boards operating as 
incorporated associations. 
Licensees within an SNP are 
required to become a member of 
the local board. As of 1 October 
2014, 15 Safe Night Precincts had 
been prescribed. 
LAST DRINKS POLICIES
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT? The restriction of on-premises alcohol sales after a specified time at night or in the early 
hours of the morning, without requiring venue closure.
POLICY SCORE: 8 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Strong evidence to support effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related harm.
• Low administrative and financial burden.
• Easily introduced through licensing systems.
CONS: Politically controversial due to significant industry opposition.
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Evidence of impact 
It has been claimed that last 
drinks policies have been 
associated with venues tending 
to close at the time after which 
alcohol could not be served.
This suggests that assessment of 
its impact cannot be separated 
from the assessment of the 
impact of early closing hours. 
An assessment of the Newcastle 
model showed that the majority 
of reductions in assaults came 
after 3am, with little impact 
evident between 1am and 3am, 
suggesting that the trading hour 
restrictions was the key policy.
Despite this, more recent 
evidence from lockout and last 
drinks in NSW suggest that a 
reduction in harm was observed 
during both the lockout period 
and following last drinks.
Another NSW evaluation 
concluded that, “the January 
2014 reforms appear to have 
reduced the incidence of assault 
in the Kings Cross and CBD 
entertainment precincts. The 
extent to which this is due to a 
change in alcohol consumption 
or a change in the number of 
people visiting the Kings Cross 
and Sydney Entertainment 
Precincts remains unknown”.
Despite this, the decline in foot-
traffic following the introduction 
of lockout and last drinks was 
only 19.4 per cent.
This is considerably less than 
the 45.1 per cent reduction 
observed in the number of non-
domestic assaults, suggesting 
that the safety of the Kings Cross 
region had increased after the 
introduction of the measures. 
Additionally, a marked 20.3 per 
cent reduction was observed 
in the Sydney CBD Precinct, 
which was also subject to the 
measures.
Evidence of reduced alcohol-
related violence has been 
complemented by research 
that has identified significant 
reductions in associated harm. 
In particular, alcohol-related 
serious injury presentations to 
the local St Vincent’s Hospital 
during high alcohol times 
reduced by a quarter (24.8 per 
cent) in the 12 months following 
the introduction of the new 
liquor regulations. 
Similarly, it was reported that 
serious facial injuries requiring 
surgery reduced by 60 per cent 
in the two years after last drinks 
and lockouts were imposed.
In addition to the significant 
reduction in alcohol-related 
harm following last drinks, 
positive transformation 
of the local economy was 
also observed. Industry 
sources reported that CBD 
Entertainment Precinct 
businesses had successfully 
moved away from reliance 
on late-night alcohol sales to 
more diverse business models, 
including food offerings. 
In addition to the transformation 
of existing businesses, a variety 
of new businesses entered the 
market also seeking to profit 
from diversification of the 
region. This was supported by 
local residents’ observations 
of 70 new businesses in the 
region, including hairdressers, 
restaurants, ice creameries, and 
small bars.
Similar observations were 
made in the Newcastle region 
following introduction of 
trading hour restrictions there. 
Together, it appears that last 
drinks (as part of a package of 
reform measures) have been 
successful in moving night time 
economies away from reliance 
on harmful business models to a 
healthy, more diversified range 
of entertainment options. 
Resource requirements/
implications
Implementation of this policy 
requires the deployment of 
compliance officers during late 
trading periods to monitor 
and assess compliance with 
legislation and take enforcement 
action where necessary.
Political support for policy
Controversy surrounded the 
introduction of lockout and last 
drinks policies in Kings Cross and 
Sydney CBD in 2014, and more 
recently in Queensland (where 
policies were introduced state-
wide in July 2016). Following the 
review of the 2014 liquor law 
reforms, it was recommended 
that both lockouts and last 
drinks measures be relaxed 
slightly. The NSW Government 
adopted the recommendations, 
and relaxed last drinks from 3am 
to 3:30am in early 2017.
Initially there had been little 
political will to restrict trading 
hours, as the alcohol industry 
strongly opposed any such 
restriction.
A 2013 review of the Liquor Act 
2007 (NSW) concluded that, 
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despite many submissions 
calling for a blanket closing 
time of 3am to be introduced, 
there was “insufficient research 
to inform the review that this is 
the optimal closure hour that 
would result in an acceleration 
of the rates of decline in alcohol-
related violence evidenced since 
2008”.
Furthermore, the review 
concluded that the current 
legislative framework was 
sufficient to deal with risk 
areas through a variety of 
enforcement initiatives.
However, when a young man 
died in Kings Cross on New Year’s 
Eve in 2013 as a result of alcohol-
related violence, following a 
similar death in July 2012, the 
spate of headlines and sense of 
crisis pushed the conservative 
NSW Government to take a 
different stance and push 
through the raft of reforms in 
early 2014. While the opposition 
Labor party supported the 
measure, the Greens claimed 
that the response failed to go 
to the heart of the problem: 
“dangerous promotions and 
deep discounting, failure to 
enforce Responsible Service of 
Alcohol, excessive liquor outlet 
densities and the inevitable 
consequences of a limited zone 
of application of last drinks”. 
Following their introduction, 
opponents to the measures 
coordinated a social media 
campaign and a large protest 
march to ‘Keep Sydney Open’. 
At the same time, supporters 
of the reforms rallied around a 
‘Last Drinks Coalition’, comprised 
of health professionals and 
frontline services. This coalition 
argued that reversing the laws 
would be a “travesty and would 
put innocent lives at risk”.
The death of a teenager in a 
one-punch attack moved the 
Queensland Government to 
review legislation to address 
alcohol-fuelled violence. In 2016, 
the Queensland Government 
passed a bill to phase in a variety 
of measures including last drinks 
under some controversy. It was 
not supported by the opposition 
conservative party and required 
the support of crossbench MPs 
that were able to negotiate 
several concessions.
While violent incidents that 
resulted in the death of young 
men catalysed introduction of 
trading hour restrictions in each 
state, public health campaigners 
have long advocated for such 
policies. It would appear that 
high-profile examples of the 
harm caused by late-night 
alcohol trade provided the 
public support necessary to 
instigate reforms.
Policy mechanisms
The conditions imposed on 
the late trading hotels in 
Newcastle in 2008 were based 
on a provision in the Liquor Act 
2007 (NSW) enabling regulatory 
action to be taken when two or 
more licensed premises were 
the subject of a disturbance 
complaint as happened in 
Newcastle.
Prescribing a precinct under 
the liquor laws enabled licence 
conditions to be imposed 
on all venues, or a subset of 
venues, located within that 
region – as was the case for the 
Kings Cross and Sydney CBD 
Entertainment precincts. The 
actual policy measures for these 
precincts were spelt out in the 
Liquor Regulation 2008 (NSW). 
In Queensland, the measures 
were defined by amendment to 
the Liquor Act 2007 (Queensland) 
through an Amendment Act 
(which had a wider scope than 
just the Liquor Act).
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Late night levies (LNLs) were 
introduced through the Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act (2011). They enable licensing 
authorities to:
Charge a levy to persons who are 
licensed to sell alcohol late at night 
in the authority’s area, as a means 
of raising a contribution towards 
the costs of policing the late-night 
economy… beginning at or after 
midnight and ending at or before 
6am.
The levy applies to all premises 
with a licence to operate past 
the designated time (usually 
midnight) regardless of whether 
the venue uses this time in 
practice. Councils are required 
to give at least 70 per cent of the 
net revenue raised to the local 
Police and Crime Commissioner 
(PCC). There are no restrictions 
on what the PCC’s portion of 
the levy revenue can be spent 
on, although in practice many 
areas have committed to spend 
the revenue on the local night 
time economy. Within the LNL 
guidance, there are limitations 
on the way the Council can use 
its remaining share. The money 
spent by the Council must 
relate to initiatives that aim 
to reduce crime and disorder, 
promote public safety, reduce or 
prevent public nuisance, or clean 
infrastructure in the local area.
At present, the LNL has only 
been adopted in a handful 
of areas including Newcastle, 
Cheltenham, Islington, City 
of London, Nottingham, 
Chelmsford, Southampton, and 
Camden. A number of other 
areas have consulted on one and 
decided not to proceed, while 
others are currently preparing 
to run a consultation. However, 
Cheltenham will be removing 
their LNL and replacing this with 
a Business Improvement District 
(BID), which is seen as more 
business friendly and could 
supposedly raise more revenue.
Local government is responsible 
for liquor licensing decisions 
in the UK. Currently, legislative 
restrictions mean that an LNL 
can only be applied to an entire 
local government area, and this 
inflexibility has limited its use. In 
many areas, it is viewed as unfair 
to charge the levy to rural pubs 
and premises when the vast 
majority of the policing demand 
comes from the town centre. 
Those local governments that 
have introduced an LNL have 
tended to be more compact 
and urban in nature, where 
this concern is less apparent. 
However, in early 2016 the 
Home Office announced plans 
to make the LNL more flexible 
to implement, which should 
encourage its uptake. 
Another factor that has limited 
uptake is a concern that LNLs 
may not always be financially 
viable, with the cost of 
administering and enforcing the 
LNL outweighing its benefits. 
Premises involved with voluntary 
schemes such as BIDs and Best 
Bar None (BBN) can receive a 
30 per cent reduction in the 
levy if they are seen to reduce 
crime and disorder. This can 
make a significant difference to 
the amount of revenue raised. 
LATE NIGHT LEVIES
LOCATION: England and Wales
WHAT IS IT?
Additional fees charged to licensed premises remaining open after midnight. A portion of 
funds are assigned to public resources associated with the night time economy, and are 
split between the council and local police.
POLICY SCORE: 4 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: Addresses market failures by holding licensed venues more accountable for the cost 
associated with the late night trade of alcohol.
CONS: 
• Currently geographically inflexible.
• Base fees on trading hours alone rather than including other risk factors, such as 
compliance history.
• Administratively burdensome, often with poor returns.
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However, while these voluntary 
schemes can have benefits in 
terms of increased cooperation 
between the licensing team, 
the police, and the licensed 
trade, the evidence for a link 
between these schemes and a 
reduction in crime and disorder 
is very limited (see the voluntary 
industry case study for more).
While administrative burden 
and financial benefits are key 
considerations, LNLs also appear 
to have the effect of reducing 
the availability of alcohol after 
midnight by encouraging 
some venues to close earlier. 
While it is difficult to quantify 
this impact, it is likely to have 
a positive effect on alcohol-
related problems in areas with 
high concentrations of premises. 
However, while premises can 
stop serving alcohol at midnight 
to avoid paying the levy, they are 
not required to shut and patrons 
may potentially stockpile 
beverages and continue drinking 
after midnight. 
Evidence of impact
No formal evaluations have 
yet investigated the impact 
of LNLs. However, legal firm 
Poppleston Allen submitted 
freedom of information requests 
to a number of areas in order 
to identify the impact of their 
respective LNLs one year after 
implementation. 
Previous research has also 
examined their impact using 
Cheltenham and Newcastle as 
case studies. Overall Cheltenham 
raised £616.86 per premises 
affected by the LNL, while 
Newcastle raised almost double 
this at £1,168.50 per premises. 
This may be due to relative size 
of the venues in Newcastle, as 
large venues pay higher fees. 
However, in Cheltenham the 
scheme only brought in 39 per 
cent of the amount predicted 
in part due to a smaller number 
of premises affected by the LNL, 
but also the fact that 49 of the 
123 premises were eligible for a 
discount as they were members 
of best practice schemes. 
Newcastle just hit its overall 
revenue target, with 130 venues 
receiving a 30 per cent discount. 
The council estimated that these 
exceptions were worth £18,000. 
Both Cheltenham and Newcastle 
have decided to split the 
revenue 70:30, and come to 
agreements with their PCC that 
funds from the LNL will be spent 
within the city.44,45
These examples suggest that in 
certain circumstances the LNL 
can work to secure additional 
funding for use within the 
night time economy. There are 
significant differences in the 
extent to which this has been 
achieved, with Cheltenham only 
raising 39 per cent of its target. 
The examples also illustrate the 
potential for levy exemptions 
to erode the additional revenue 
base.
In addition to securing 
additional revenue, levies may 
also provide a price signal to 
ensure that businesses account 
for the full cost associated with 
their operation. Late night 
alcohol trade presents elevated 
risk of harm, which places 
additional burden on public 
resources. When businesses 
are held accountable for these 
additional costs, an economic 
distortion is addressed to 
improve the operation of the 
market. In this manner, the levies 
both secure additional revenue 
and influence business decisions 
to lessen harm. 
Key issues relating to the impact 
of LNLs include how revenue is 
spent, whether this is beneficial 
for the night time economy, and 
whether crime and disorder is 
reduced. Cheltenham took a 
creative approach, seeking “to 
promote greater diversity in the 
night-time economy that is less 
focused on alcohol”.46 This has 
involved opening an alcohol-free 
venue, purchasing a multi-use 
community van, and paying for 
a coordinator for the Purple Flag 
voluntary scheme.
Some within the licensed trade 
have called for the LNL to be 
scrapped. Critics have suggested 
the way money has been spent 
was “against the spirit of the 
regulations” and that it has been 
used to fund activity that would 
normally be covered by regular 
local authority budgets.47 Some 
have also stated there has been 
no visible change in policing 
levels as a result of the levy, 
with suggestions this might be 
a bigger priority for the licensed 
trade. At present, there has been 
no evaluation of the impact 
these schemes have had on 
law and order or cleanliness in 
the night time economy within 
Cheltenham.
Newcastle has spent its LNL 
funds on a range of initiatives 
such as street pastors, taxi 
marshals, bar and nightclub 
scanners, additional CCTV, street 
cleaning, and a ‘Safe Haven’ 
scheme for anyone who is in 
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difficulty. It was not possible to 
find details of how much these 
initiatives have cost or how they 
have been split between the 
police and council sections of 
the LNL revenue. 
As mentioned, there has not 
yet been a formal evaluation 
of the LNL. It does seem that 
the scheme can successfully 
raise funds, although there is 
perhaps a need to focus more 
on how these funds can be 
spent effectively and in line with 
the regulations. As legal firm 
John Gaunt and Partners have 
summarised, “Initial findings 
would suggest the LNL schemes 
have been effective in raising 
additional revenue but their 
impact on crime and disorder is 
yet to be established”.48
It is interesting that in these 
cases, no money was used to 
provide additional police officers 
on Friday or Saturday nights, 
which was ostensibly one of the 
LNL’s aims. In Nottingham, it was 
specifically stated that revenue 
would be used to fund two night 
time Community Protection 
Officer posts.49 Similarly, 
Islington paid for private security 
patrols out of LNL funds in order 
to assist the local police.
Resource requirements/
implications
Experience suggests that the 
LNL is quite an administrative 
burden. While in Cheltenham 
it cost £1,015.15 to administer 
in the first year,50 in Newcastle 
this figure was £22,500.51 These 
figures are small compared with 
the net revenue raised, but they 
do point towards significant time 
and resourcing implications. In 
addition, many areas where the 
LNL has been introduced have 
allowed premises to vary their 
licence free of charge if they 
wished to bring forward their 
terminal hour to midnight in 
order to avoid paying the levy. 
This created considerable work 
in some areas.
Political support for policy
As mentioned, the current 
geographic inflexibility of 
the levy has created political 
problems and prevented this 
measure from being introduced 
in many areas. Moves to make 
the policy more flexible so the 
levy can be applied only to town 
centres and particular areas with 
high concentrations of problems 
should help to address these 
barriers to implementation. 
However, the fact that 
Cheltenham has removed its 
LNL in favour of a BID, which is 
business run and therefore more 
acceptable to business, suggests 
that other areas may take this 
approach. This is particularly 
because LNLs are greatly disliked 
by the licensed trade in many 
areas. Typical trade arguments 
include stating that LNLs 
undermine local working, and 
that they amount to an unfair 
tax on the industry.
Opponents to the LNLs in 
Cheltenham have suggested 
there has been no visible change 
in policing levels as a result of 
the levy. However, there has 
been no systematic evaluation 
of the impact of these schemes 
on law and order or cleanliness 
to date.
Policy mechanisms
LNLs are available as a policy 
options to councils in England 
and Wales through the Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act (2011). 
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Risk-based licensing (RBL) is 
not in itself a temporal policy 
but a licensing fee system. 
However, it does have temporal 
implications, with additional fees 
charged based on trading hour 
(similar to the late night levy). 
RBL fees have been introduced 
in four Australian states and 
one territory – Queensland 
in 2008, Victoria in 2009, the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
in 2010, South Australia in 2012, 
and New South Wales (NSW) 
in 2014. The basic principle is 
that higher liquor licence fees 
should be paid by licensees 
of premises associated with 
higher levels of harm. They 
have been justified as a means 
of contributing annually to, or 
even recovering, the cost of 
maintaining a strong regulatory 
and compliance system. RBL is 
described as “a motivational tool 
whereby licensees are induced 
by lower fees to select less risky 
business models, comply with 
their legislative obligations, 
and take proactive measures to 
reduce alcohol-related violence 
and disorder in and around their 
venues”.52 Most commonly, the 
policy is outlined in broad terms 
in the relevant Liquor Act with 
the details of its implementation 
provided in the relevant 
regulations. 
No two jurisdictions have 
introduced RBL in the same 
way. The calculation of the 
RBL fee is based on factors 
such as trading hours (in all 
five jurisdictions), licence type 
(four), venue capacity (four), 
compliance history (three), and 
liquor volume or gross purchase 
value (two). Where adopted, 
these factors are defined 
differently across jurisdictions. 
NSW in particular has a complex 
set of elements including, for 
packaged liquor, consideration 
of how many licences a licensee 
holds in determining the fees. 
NSW also has a ‘location risk 
loading’ for all relevant licence 
types, which is a patron capacity 
loading that is only payable 
if the compliance history risk 
loading element is payable.
Despite Section 128 of the 
Liquor Control Act 1998 
(Western Australia) stating that 
regulations may prescribe 
licence fees based on the licence 
type, the type of premises, 
location of premises, capacity 
of premises, trading hours, 
convictions and disciplinary 
action, only the licence type 
attracts different fees in the 
Liquor Control Regulations (1989) 
(Schedule 3) (Western Australia). 
A modest recommendation by 
the 2013 Independent Review 
Committee53 to base the licence 
fee on the floor area of the 
licensed premises, taken to be 
a de facto measure of liquor 
volume and easier to define than 
volume, has not been adopted.
Evidence of impact
The impact of risk-based 
licensing has been assessed 
in the ACT, where it was 
concluded that it was difficult 
to demonstrate that its 
implementation was responsible 
for the observed declines in 
RISK-BASED LICENSING
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT?
Weighting licence fees based on factors contributing to the risk associated with venues’ 
operation. Such factors typically include a combination of licence type, venue capacity, 
compliance history, and liquor volume or gross purchase value.
POLICY SCORE: 7 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Very low resource burden, as such schemes typically generate additional revenue.
• Readily justified on the basis that businesses must meet the social and economic costs 
associated with their operation.
• Economically efficient in addressing market externalities, whereby business profit may 
otherwise be generated an expense to the public.
CONS: Limited evidence of effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related harm. May be viewed as 
downstream approach.
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alcohol-related offences.54 For 
example, other factors such as 
a concurrent increase in police 
resources may have played 
a role. However, the authors 
make a case for its continuation 
based on stakeholder belief in 
its benefits, its role in recovering 
costs of alcohol prevention 
policing, its equity in ensuring 
venues presenting greater risk 
pay a larger share of the costs 
and, lastly, as there has been no 
evidence of any detriment to the 
liquor licensing market following 
its introduction.
The breadth of licence classes 
covered and scale of risk 
weighting applied to fees 
are both likely to influence 
the extent to which risk-
based licensing is effective 
in recovering costs and 
shaping more responsible 
business practices. For this 
reason, the South Australian 
implementation of risk-based 
licensing has been criticised 
for not including off-premise 
licences and because “their 
meagre fees do not correspond 
with the volume of liquor 
and risk of associated harms 
they introduce to homes and 
communities”.55
Resource requirements/
implications
The collection of licence fees 
is legislated; therefore, no 
new resources are required 
to collect fees according to a 
different schedule. However, 
use of the risk criteria is often 
limited by availability of data. 
For instance, when the Victorian 
risk criteria were adopted, 
differentiation by type of 
establishment was limited by 
the fact that licence types are 
relatively undifferentiated in the 
state. Also, information on the 
‘maximum patron number’ was 
missing for about 30 per cent 
of licences in Victorian licensing 
agency data, thus limiting the 
accuracy of weighting applied 
to licence fees on the basis 
of venue capacity. Further, 
including the amount of 
alcohol sold as a risk criterion 
may amount to a state tax on 
alcoholic beverages, which by 
High Court decision is reserved 
to the Australian Government. 
It is not known if some audit 
process is required to make sure 
licensees are paying the correct 
amount. However, enforcing 
compliance to risk-based 
licensing schedules is not likely 
to result in any marked increase 
to existing administrative costs. 
In addition, data collected 
through the implementation 
of this policy may contribute to 
better planning and evaluation.
Political support for policy
The widespread adoption of this 
measure indicates a strong level 
of support for the measure on 
the attractive ‘higher risk user 
pays’ principle.
Policy mechanisms
As outlined, almost all Australian 
jurisdictions introduced risk-
based licensing through a 
high-level statement of the 
potential for fee setting in 
the relevant Liquor Act. They 
then give details of the fees 
based on risk assessments 
of, for example, licence type, 
trading hours, capacity, size, 
location, availability of meals, 
and compliance history in the 
associated regulations. The 
ACT does not use regulations 
but instead uses a ‘disallowable 
instrument’, an instrument 
that must be tabled and 
is open to Parliamentary 
veto or disallowance for a 
set period, usually fifteen 
sitting days. However, since 
regulations are classified as 
legislative instruments, and 
they are therefore subject to 
disallowance, the effect appears 
to be the same. 
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Research has consistently 
demonstrated that increased 
trading hours is associated 
with higher rates of alcohol-
related harm.56,57,58 The temporal 
relationship also supports the 
use of policies that reduce 
consumption of alcohol at times 
when the consequent harms are 
likely to be greatest. A variety 
of approaches has been used in 
Australia and the UK, including 
increased fees for businesses 
trading after a designated time, 
and restriction on sale of certain 
products or on all sales during a 
nominated period. This section 
examines several approaches 
to the temporal restriction of 
alcohol sales, including risk-
based licence fees and cessation 
of sales (last drinks) measures, 
with the view to assessing the 
factors contributing to success 
and limitations of each.
Increased licence fees for high 
risk and late night trading 
There are obvious parallels 
between the late night levy 
(LNL) scheme available to local 
councils in England and Wales, 
and the risk-based licensing 
(RBL) employed in a number 
of jurisdictions in Australia. 
Both schemes aim to partially 
recoup the significant public 
costs associated with late night 
trade of alcohol by charging 
businesses larger fees for later 
trade. These measures may 
send price signals to ensure 
alcohol industry profits are not 
generated at the expense of 
individual patrons and society 
more broadly. Such policies 
thereby address negative 
externalities by encouraging 
businesses to more accurately 
incorporate the true costs of 
their operation into business 
decisions.
Despite similarities, the 
fundamental differences 
between policy approaches 
provide opportunities for lessons 
in licensing policy. These include 
lessons in relation to temporal 
differentiation and incorporation 
of compliance history into 
licence fees. The legislative 
provisions for fee systems are 
discussed, as well as differences 
in the scale of fees charged in 
the UK and Australia.
Premises specific vs one size 
fits all
While both RBL and LNL are 
applied consistently across a 
licensing area, fees charged 
under RBL are, by definition, 
specific to individual premises 
and are reflective of fee levels 
reflecting their risk profile. In 
NSW, for example, businesses 
seeking to extend trading hours 
to 1:30am are charged less than 
those licensed to trade to 3am.59 
Similarly, licensed venues in the 
ACT are charged differentiated 
fees based on licensed time 
of last drinks.60 Venue type 
and capacity is also taken into 
account, allowing for fees to 
more accurately reflect the risk 
profile of premises.
This is different from the LNL, 
which incorporates risk profiles 
more loosely. Premises pay fees 
within a certain band depending 
on their rateable value, with 
all premises trading after 
the designated time (usually 
midnight) paying, regardless of 
their closing hour. The type of 
premise (for instance, nightclub, 
restaurant) is not taken into 
account, and the levy must be 
applied across a whole local 
authority area, rather than to key 
night time economy locations 
that generate the bulk of the 
costs the LNL is intended to 
cover.
Plans to make the LNL more 
flexible have recently been 
announced by the UK Home 
Office, which should improve the 
situation. If local governments 
were given the ability to set 
their own licensing fees in 
England and Wales, a number 
have indicated a preference for 
an approach similar to RBL for 
determining fee levels using 
characteristics such as venue 
type and closing hour. The ability 
to set these fees is something 
that the Local Government 
Association, the representative 
body for local government in the 
UK, has continually pushed for.
Motivations to reduce risk
These two policies incentivise 
businesses to reduce risk 
associated with their operation, but 
they do so in different manners. 
Once in place, the LNL rewards 
businesses for demonstrating a 
commitment to harm reduction, 
an assumption based on their 
membership of best-practice 
schemes. However, as detailed 
in the case study, many of these 
voluntary schemes have limited or 
poorly evidenced effectiveness in 
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reducing alcohol-related harm. In 
contrast, RBL recognises effective 
management practices based on 
an individual venue’s compliance 
history. In principle, this holds 
businesses accountable for specific 
problems associated with their 
recent operation and penalises 
businesses for bad behaviour, 
although slack enforcement of 
compliance standards often means 
that this penalty is not often 
applied. 
Recouping costs
Since RBL and LNLs aim to recoup 
a proportion of the full cost of 
alcohol sales, and provide greater 
incentive for venues to reduce 
harm associated with their 
operation, the efficacy of these 
policies may be evaluated with 
respect to reductions in alcohol-
related harm and increases in 
generated revenue. It is worth 
noting that the variety of policies 
employed across local councils 
in the UK and jurisdictions in 
Australia limits the extent to 
which comparisons can be made.  
In addition, the lack of robust 
evaluation of LNLs in the 
UK means there is limited 
information relating to the 
impact these have had on 
alcohol-related harm. However, 
the efficacy of such risk-based 
licensing schemes may be 
compared on typical revenue 
generated per venue. 
The extent to which such 
policies reduce alcohol-related 
harm may also be considered on 
the basis of evidence from their 
use in Australia.
Figures 1 and 2 outline the 
charges imposed under LNLs 
in the UK and the RBL systems 
in the ACT and NSW. Although 
rates vary across licence classes 
and jurisdictions, it is clear 
that the risk-based licence fees 
charged for late night trading 
in Australia are considerably 
higher than LNLs introduced 
in the UK. In addition, the LNL 
has only been introduced in a 
handful of local governments 
JURISDICTION PREMISES TYPE ANNUAL COST FOR OPENING POST-MIDNIGHT
LNL (handful of local 
authorities in England)
Bar: Band B rateable 
value (54% of all licensed 
premises)
£768/A$1,295
Nightclub: Band E 
rateable value (8% of all 
licensed premises)
£1,493/A$2,517 (if the fee multiplier was used this 
would rise to £4,479/A$7,548 but the multiplier is 
applied only 6% of the time) 
Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT)
Nightclub licence 
(capacity 60)
£1,600/$2,697 to open after midnight, but no 
difference for closing hours thereafter
Nightclub licence 
(capacity 100+)
Approximately £6,404/A$10,792 for trading hours from 
1am to 5am
New South Wales 
(NSW)
Small bar licence 
(capacity 60)
A$0 – small bars are exempt from trading hour risk 
calculations (and are granted automatic extensions to 
2am close)
Nightclub licence 
(capacity 100)
Trading past midnight: £1,483/A$2,500 
Trading after 1:30am: £2,967/A$5,000
FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH LNL AND RBL
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across England, so its impact as 
a vehicle for addressing costs 
in the night time economy has 
so far been minimal across the 
country.
Investigation of RBL’s impact 
on alcohol-related harm has 
been limited by inconsistent 
implementation and the 
simultaneous introduction 
of complementary measures. 
Consequently, results have so far 
been inconclusive. This warrants 
further research to determine 
the extent to which greater 
differentiation of risk-based fees 
may result in more effective harm 
reduction. Such differentiation 
should, in any case, improve 
alignment between fees charged 
to licensed venues and the 
cost such business imposes on 
the public. Deakin University 
is currently undertaking a 
study on risk-based licensing 
that evaluates changes in 
Emergency Department 
presentations, assault offences, 
foot traffic, enforcement, and 
patron intoxication inside 
licensed venues following 
the implementation of risk-
based licensing. The study also 
evaluates the effectiveness and 
ease of implementation of RBL 
from the perspective of key 
stakeholders (police, licensing 
officials, council personnel, and 
venue operators).
While questions remain in 
relation to the effectiveness of 
both policies at reducing alcohol-
related harm, it is clear that RBL 
recovers a larger proportion of 
public expense associated with 
the licensed trade than the LNL. 
In addition, RBL more accurately 
reflects the risk profile of licensed 
premises by including a broader 
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF THE COSTS OF OPENING POST-MIDNIGHT, BETWEEN THE LNL IN THE UK AND RBL IN 
THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY AND NEW SOUTH WALES
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range of risk factors in fee 
calculations.
Plans have already been 
announced to make the LNL 
more targeted so it can be 
applied only to venues in areas 
that are most likely to result in 
additional costs. This will be a big 
improvement but does not go as 
far as RBL, which allocates costs 
depending on the risk of the 
operating hours and venue type 
no matter the location. As the 
example of Cheltenham suggests, 
this change does not mean that 
LNLs will necessarily become all 
that more commonplace. 
The LNL could be further altered 
to better reflect the closing hour, 
including incremental costs that 
reflect longer trading, rather 
than a single cost for all venues 
remaining open after midnight. 
Comparison of the costs levels 
between the LNL and RBL also 
suggests that rates charged 
under the LNL are relatively 
low. While the licensed trade 
in England and Wales would 
strongly resist any cost increase, it 
is worth noting that low licensing 
fees mean many already fail to 
pay enough to cover the cost of 
running the licensing system. This 
has cost local government £180 
million over the last ten years,61 
so it could be argued an increase 
in licensing fees, alongside the 
better application of a more 
effective LNL, are needed for the 
licensed trade to properly pay 
their way. 
The insufficiency of risk loading 
to cover the costs imposed by 
the alcohol trade was also noted 
in the independent review of the 
2014 NSW liquor law reforms. The 
Hon Ian Callinan AC noted, “no 
matter how the calculations are 
done, to the extent that they can 
accurately be done, it is unlikely 
that the financial benefits of 
the manufacture, sale and 
consumption of alcohol and any 
associated or subsidized activities 
such as entertainment, outweigh 
the financial costs (leaving aside 
incalculable social costs) of 
alcohol” (p.31, para 1.41).62
Venue closure and cessation of 
alcohol sales
Examination of UK and 
Australian policies that restrict 
the sale of alcohol in the early 
hours of the morning provides 
an opportunity for insight into 
the effectiveness of the various 
approaches. In particular, key 
lessons may be observed from 
the level to which measures 
have been legislated and the 
flawed arguments employed 
by alcohol industry interests in 
opposition to their use.
As shown in the case study, 
evidence suggests that temporal 
restrictions on alcohol sales in 
the early morning are effective in 
reducing alcohol-related harm. 
In Australia, such ‘last drinks’ 
policies have been introduced in 
the Kings Cross and Sydney CBD 
Precincts in NSW, and across the 
state of Queensland. In the UK, 
national legislative mechanisms 
have provided for introduction 
of Early Morning Restriction 
Order (EMRO)s at the discretion 
of local councils. The Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act (2011), which amended 
the Licensing Act (2003), allows 
councils to enforce a restriction 
on sales past a designated 
time between midnight and 
6am. However, opposition 
from the licensed trade and 
difficulties using the legislation 
experienced by the police and 
local government mean that no 
council has yet introduced an 
EMRO.63
While councils in the UK are 
theoretically able to adopt 
an EMRO at the council level, 
Australian states and territories 
must independently legislate 
for state-wide ‘last drinks’ 
policies. Some jurisdictions have 
introduced last drinks policies 
while others have not. Several 
states allow the sale of alcohol 
until 5am or 6am (including 
Victoria, Western Australia, and 
South Australia), while some 
regions have moved to prevent 
sales after 3am (including the 
Kings Cross, Sydney CBD, and 
Newcastle regions of NSW and 
Queensland). 
The introduction of temporal 
restrictions in one region is likely 
to displace some patronage and 
associated harm to alternative 
entertainment precincts. 
Research suggests there was 
a minor increase in assaults in 
an area adjacent to Kings Cross 
and Sydney CBD following 
the introduction of temporal 
restrictions in these regions in 
2014.64 The increase was very 
small, however, and outweighed 
by reductions within the 
precinct.65 The rate of assaults 
was found to be stable across 
adjacent and distal precincts 
more generally. 
This suggests that, even where 
alternative entertainment 
precincts are in close proximity, 
adoption of EMROs by one 
council will achieve a reduction 
in harm overall. However, these 
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findings were based on only 
two years of data and cannot 
rule out the possibility that 
patronage (with associated 
economic activity and alcohol-
related harm) will shift from 
regions imposing last drinks 
to those without such policies 
over the longer term. In that 
event, the harm reduction 
achieved by last drinks policies 
would be undermined by 
the economic incentive for 
regions not to participate. The 
relative geographic isolation 
of population centres means 
Australia is less susceptible to 
such displacement, especially 
between jurisdictions when 
measures are introduced in 
state and territory legislation. In 
contrast, relative ease of travel 
between alternative night time 
precincts in the UK is likely to 
increase issues associated with 
displacement of economic 
activity and alcohol-related 
harm. 
As a result, consistent 
application of temporal 
restriction across entertainment 
precincts may be of particular 
importance in the UK, where 
travel between locations is 
more practical. While state-level 
policies in Australia are effective 
in this respect (and have recently 
been installed in Queensland, for 
example), EMROs are likely to be 
more beneficial when applied to 
a broader region than currently 
provided for under the Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act (2011). This would reduce 
the economic disincentive 
for regions to introduce such 
policies, and would negate any 
potential for displacement of 
antisocial behaviour.
The NSW experience in 
Australia has demonstrated 
that containment of the harm 
associated with night time 
activity may assist regions to 
diversify and strengthen the 
local economy. Not only have 
the measures been effective in 
reducing alcohol-related assaults 
in Newcastle, there has actually 
been a considerable increase 
in the number of licensed 
venues in the region since the 
introduction of last drinks (and 
lockouts) in 2008.66 While the 
closure of several clubs in Kings 
Cross was attributed to measures 
introduced in 2014, a variety of 
other businesses have been seen 
to enter the market, including 
antique dealers, ice cream 
vendors, chemists, restaurants, 
hairdressers, and yoga studios, 
as well as a number of new 
bars. 67 There is also evidence 
that, while there has been a 
reduction in land value of some 
commercial property, large 
increases have been observed in 
both mixed-use and residential 
property in the Kings Cross 
region.68,69
Summary 
Research has identified trading 
hour restrictions as among 
the most effective policies in 
reducing the harm associated 
with alcohol.70 Several Australian 
jurisdictions have moved to 
restrict the trading hours of 
on-premises and packaged 
liquor venues, supported by 
increased public support for 
these measures following a 
number of high-profile alcohol-
fuelled violent incidents and the 
deaths of several young men. 
The policies have expanded 
from Newcastle to Kings Cross 
and the Sydney CBD in NSW, and 
more recently to Queensland. 
Despite majority public 
support,71 opponents to the 
lockout and last drink measures 
have propagated considerable 
political opposition. However, 
the measures have been highly 
successful in their objective to 
reduce alcohol harm. Research 
suggests that introduction of 
the measures in Sydney NSW 
have resulted in a 45.1 per cent 
reduction in non-domestic 
assault in Kings Cross and a 
reduction of 20.3 per cent in 
Sydney CBD.72
In England and Wales, EMROs 
have also received strong 
opposition from the licensed 
trade. However, it is perhaps 
incorrect to assume that the 
failure to introduce an EMRO 
is only a result of this factor. 
Failings regarding procedures 
and evidence gathering by 
the police and local authority 
in Blackpool had a significant 
impact on the negative 
outcome, in what has become 
something of a test case.73 
Regardless, the fact that local 
government in England and 
Wales are not able to bring in 
restrictions on closing hour, 
despite the clear evidence 
this has a significant impact in 
reducing alcohol-related harm, 
is a clear gap in the effectiveness 
of the Licensing Act (2003).
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CONCLUSIONS
Lessons for the UK:
There are clear lessons for the UK policymakers from the positive impact that restrictions on very late closing 
hours can have on rates of alcohol-related harm. In theory, EMROs may be used to this end under the 
Licensing Act (2003), but this is yet to be implemented anywhere. If introduced in particular metropolitan 
areas, their efficacy is also likely to be undermined by the proximity of alternative precincts, with individuals 
likely to move from one area to another.
With respect to basing fees on the risk presented by venues, risk loading applied under LNLs is considerably 
lower than in Australia. The effectiveness of these measures, in reducing the public burden of the late-night 
trade of alcohol by holding venues accountable for expenses, may be improved by increasing the amount 
charged and incorporating more factors into risk calculations to target the riskiest premises. The UK may learn 
from Australia’s example in incorporating venue capacity and a differentiated scale for closing time into the 
fees charged to particular businesses. If local government were able to set their own fees, some have already 
indicated they would want to move towards a similar approach. 
Lessons for Australia:
Temporal alcohol policy appears to be more developed in Australia than in the UK. The wider use of last 
drinks policies would be beneficial. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Restrict trading hours for off-licence liquor
Limit off-licence opening hours to between 10am and 10pm, or similar.
2. Restrict trading hours of on-licence venues to limit the availability of alcohol after midnight
Place appropriate restrictions on the hours at which alcohol may be sold to reduce harm associated with late 
night trade and, to the extent possible, restrict the availability of alcohol after midnight and in the early morning 
hours.
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CUMULATIVE IMPACT POLICIES
prospective licence applications 
deemed unlikely to add to the 
cumulative impact in the area can 
still be granted on their merits. 
However, CIPs create a ‘rebuttable 
presumption’ that applications 
deemed likely to add to the 
existing cumulative impact will 
normally be refused, or subject to 
certain limitations.
Local governments are required 
to set out CIPs within their 
Statement of Licensing Policy 
(SLP), along with evidence 
that premises in an area are 
collectively generating a negative 
cumulative impact. A local 
consultation is carried out as part 
of this process.
CIPs vary in size and can cover 
areas ranging from the size of a 
town centre to a specific street 
or in some cases a specific street 
corner. CIPs can be introduced 
for both the on and off-trades, 
and for late night refreshment 
establishments such as kebab 
or fast food shops. The guidance 
points towards the impact of 
large numbers of people in the 
local area as a key consideration, 
including people leaving venues 
or queuing for transportation 
or food. In such a situation, 
the licensing objectives are 
more likely to be undermined. 
However, large numbers of 
people are not a prerequisite for 
CIP, particularly when they are 
focused on the off-trade. 
Previous research has found that 
many licensing professionals 
question the effectiveness and 
flexibility of CIPs. Many such 
professionals reported they were 
inherently reactive and that in 
most instances councils feel the 
need to wait for problems to 
arise before they have enough 
evidence to implement a CIP. 
The process of compiling the 
evidence and consulting on a CIP 
is also considerable, and many 
questioned the extent of their 
impact.75
In Scotland, the closest 
equivalent to a CIP is an 
“overprovision policy”. 
LOCATION: England and Wales
WHAT IS IT?
Designated areas where the combined impact of licensed premises presents particular 
concern. Under cumulative impact policies, local government has additional powers to 
influence, and possibly reject, licence applications.
POLICY SCORE: 7 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Can be used as a ‘place shaping’ device to direct the development of the licensed trade 
in ways likely to be less problematic.
• Can be applied consistently across an area for an extended period.
CONS: 
• Can be resource intensive and time-consuming.
• Not necessarily effective at limiting the number of licensed premises.
• Often applied retrospectively following the emergence of problems in a region.
Cumulative impact policies 
(CIPs) were introduced in the UK 
as a tool to limit the growth of 
licensed premises in locations 
where a significant number 
of premises concentrated in 
one area could undermine 
the licensing and regulatory 
objectives. CIPs were not 
included within the 2003 
Licensing Act (LA03) itself but set 
out in the section 182 Guidance 
as a concession to campaigners 
who argued that the Act gave 
local government no powers 
to regulate areas with a very 
high number of premises. The 
fact that there are now 208 
CIPs in place across England 
and Wales demonstrates their 
necessity within the licensing 
regime,74 and in early 2016 the 
Home Office indicated that they 
would transfer CIPs into primary 
legislation, a move likely to give 
them greater weight. 
CIPs should not be seen 
as a blanket ban or quota; 
applications are still considered 
individually. In addition, 
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Licensing boards are required 
to assess whether there is an 
overprovision of premises 
within any part of their area and, 
in some ways, overprovision 
policies can operate in a similar 
manner to CIPs in England and 
Wales. In deciding upon their 
overprovision policy, licensing 
boards are required to consider 
the number, type and capacity 
of licensed premises in a locality. 
From the end of September 2016, 
they are also able to consider 
opening hours within the 
assessment.
Like CIPs, an overprovision 
policy creates a rebuttable 
presumption against the grant 
of an application. Overprovision 
on its own can be used as 
grounds for refusal, but each 
application is still taken on its 
own merit and applicants are still 
able to put forward evidence to 
demonstrate that the granting of 
the licence would not undermine 
the licensing objectives in that 
area. This means that, as with 
CIPs, overprovision policies 
cannot be seen as absolute or 
unchallengeable.
Evidence of impact
While their stated aim was to 
limit the growth of licensed 
premises, CIPs seem to be 
only partially successful at 
this. Even though CIPs create 
a presumption not to grant a 
license, the latest figures show 
that 86 per cent of applications 
or variations in CIP areas were 
still granted.76 While this does 
not account for those who were 
put off applying because of the 
CIP, it still seems to be a very 
high number (within non-CIP 
areas the figure is 91 per cent). 
The accuracy of these figures 
has been called into question, 
and the effectiveness of CIPs in 
limiting the further saturation 
of premises is unclear. Areas 
such as Newcastle, in northeast 
England, have reported success 
in using CIPs to prevent the 
further growth of the off-trade.
In practice, however, CIPs appear 
to be used for a slightly different 
purpose, and it is perhaps a 
misconception that CIPs can be 
used to actively address high 
concentrations of premises. 
Instead, these policies seem to 
primarily be used as a method 
of shaping and influencing 
the future development of 
the licensed trade within the 
CIP area -- for example, by 
encouraging restaurants or 
theatres that may add welcome 
diversity to areas otherwise 
packed with bars, potentially 
bringing a different clientele to 
the area and reducing problems.
Research in Westminster, 
London, provides an interesting 
example of this. Between 2003 
and 2013 the concentration of 
premises within the West End 
Stress Area CIP increased by 
more than 35 per cent. While 
part of this time period predates 
the Act, it demonstrates clearly 
that the CIP has not capped 
the total number of premises. 
Interestingly, 93 per cent of 
these additional businesses were 
food-led, something encouraged 
within Westminster’s Statement 
of Licensing Policy. Food-led 
venues do not necessarily mean 
that there will be a reduction 
in the volume of alcohol sold, 
but arguably altering the 
environment in this way could 
reduce alcohol-related problems. 
The shift also suggests that 
Westminster has been successful 
in using their West End Stress 
Area CIP, and their SLP, as a ‘place 
shaping’ device.77
While this is not what CIPs were 
originally intended for, it does 
seem to be a key function in 
practice, along with encouraging 
a higher standard of application, 
with many local governments 
using CIPs to impose tighter 
operating conditions on venues 
to reduce the risk of problems. 
CIPs can also be used to reduce 
or control opening hours as well 
as targeting premises assumed 
to be selling particularly cheap 
alcohol. Research has also found 
that they increase engagement 
between applicants and the 
local authority.78
Resource requirements /
implications
Establishing the evidence 
necessary for implementing 
a CIP can be quite resource 
intensive. Local governments are 
also required to seek evidence 
on whether existing CIPs have 
been effective when they review 
their Statement of Licensing 
Policy.
However, while it is necessary to 
provide some evidence on the 
need for a CIP, local government 
quite often takes an overly 
evidential view of the Act in 
general. Pressure from the licensed 
trade means many feel the need 
to use large amounts of quite 
factual evidence, and to prove very 
clearly that problems are linked to 
certain venues. However, the Act 
itself does not ask for certainty or 
definitive evidence. Rather, it asks 
licensing committees to come 
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to transparent but discretionary 
judgments that something is, or 
is not, likely to undermine the 
licensing objectives.79
Within this approach as required 
by the Act, the evidence is still 
important, as is clearly setting 
out a logical and open argument. 
Such an approach does though 
have the potential to make the 
task of implementing a CIP a 
little easier for local government 
while remaining in keeping with 
the written detail of the Act and 
Section 182 Guidance. 
Political support for policy
CIPs are well established and a 
common feature of licensing 
within England and Wales. While 
not all local governments have 
a CIP, those without them tend 
to be in rural areas less likely to 
have urban areas with a high 
concentration of licensed premises.
Policy mechanisms
Within England and Wales, CIPs 
can be introduced under the 
existing licensing framework. 
At present, their footing comes 
from secondary legislation rather 
than primary legislation, as they 
were not originally included 
in the 2003 Licensing Act. This 
has caused problems, with 
local government apparently 
less confident in using them. 
Helpfully, in early 2016 the 
Home Office indicated that they 
would transfer CIPs into primary 
legislation. This would be useful 
and potentially encourage their 
more widespread use, although 
it may not make a significant 
difference to their application in 
many cases. 
STATEMENTS OF LICENSING POLICY
LOCATION: England, Wales, and Scotland
WHAT IS IT?
A document outlining the manner in which a local authority intends to implement the 
national licensing Act at a local level, taking into account their local circumstances and 
priorities.
POLICY SCORE: 7 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Can be used in a strategic manner to highlight what licensing outcomes are in the public 
interest.
• Can be used to frame and influence individual licence applications.
CONS: • Some lack sufficient detail and may not adequately be taken into account in licensing 
decisions.
In England and Wales, local 
governments are required to 
publish a Statement of Licensing 
Policy (SLP), updated at least 
every five years, which sets 
out their general approach 
to upholding the licensing 
objectives in their area. There 
are requirements that local 
residents and local businesses 
are consulted before SLPs are 
introduced.
In Scotland, licensing boards 
are also required to produce 
SLPs. Changes in legislation 
mean they will move from being 
updated every three years 
to every five years. This will 
bring them into line with local 
government election cycles. In 
Scotland, the Health Board and 
the Local Licensing Forum also 
have to be consulted on the 
board’s policy, and Licensing 
Boards are required to undertake 
specific consultation on their 
overprovision policy with the 
police, Health Board, premises, 
and personal licence holders and 
residents. 
Scottish Licensing Forums, 
which are comprised of a 
range of licensing stakeholders 
(including local residents), offer 
advice and recommendations to 
the licensing board. While they 
cannot comment on individual 
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premises, licensing forums may 
highlight community issues or 
concerns, such as the number of 
premises in an area. The Board 
has a duty to have regard for the 
Forum’s views and must offer 
reasons for decisions that are 
contrary to advice provided by 
the Forum.80 In this way, they 
operate similarly to SLPs.
In England and Wales, SLPs 
should include any local special 
policies that are in operation, 
such as cumulative impact 
policies or measures such as 
“fixed closing times, staggered 
closing times and zoning”, which 
can be introduced under para 
13.41 of the s 182 Guidance. In 
Scotland, licensing boards are 
required to include a statement 
on overprovision within their 
SLP, as well as a policy on 
licensed hours.
Within their SLP, local 
governments may justify why 
certain hours or certain premises 
may or may not be likely to be 
deemed suitable in a certain 
area. This can make a significant 
difference to the context 
licensing applications are made 
in, as SLPs should be taken into 
consideration within every 
decision. 
However, SLPs cannot be used to 
introduce rigid, uniform policies. 
Each application must be treated 
on its merits, on a case-by-case 
basis. As such, SLPs cannot 
be absolute, and applicants 
can put forward a case as to 
why they would not have a 
negative impact on the licensing 
objectives in their particular 
location. 
Evidence of impact
In many cases, it is difficult to 
identify the impact SLPs have on 
individual licensing decisions, 
and while evaluations have 
investigated the content of 
SLPs, none has yet looked at 
their impact on decisions over 
time. Not only are there many 
different variables that could 
affect decision making, but 
SLPs differ greatly in their scope 
and detail, and in whether they 
are taken into account in each 
decision. 
Some local governments place 
little significance on their SLP, 
leaving them without much 
detail. As such, they do not set 
out a vision of what licensing 
outcomes are in the public 
interest, but rather provide an 
administrative account of the 
licensing process. In contrast, 
other local governments regard 
the SLP as a key strategic 
document, clearly outlining 
what the wider public interest 
might require from licensing, 
and including a great deal of 
local information and evidence 
to substantiate this. Local 
governments that have taken 
this approach report having 
a greater ability to shape the 
development of the licensed 
trade in their local area.81
Because licensing policies 
are not absolute and can be 
departed from, the extent 
to which they are taken into 
account in each licensing 
decision varies. Changing 
committee membership means 
new members, or changing legal 
advice, can affect the level of 
deviation from SLPs. 
Bearing in mind these 
differences, some local 
governments have successfully 
used SLPs in a deliberate and 
useful manner. Newcastle, in the 
northeast of England, has taken 
a wellbeing-orientated approach 
within their SLP, mapping 
wellbeing-related issues such 
as deprivation, crime data, and 
the overall availability of alcohol, 
and introducing CIPs in certain 
areas to ensure new premises 
do not impact negatively on 
these issues. Within their SLP, 
Newcastle justifies their use of 
CIPs:
There is evidence of a clear positive 
relationship between increased 
outlet density and alcohol 
consumption in adults and young 
people. The evidence shows that 
increases in alcohol outlet density 
tend to be associated not only with 
an increase in alcohol consumption, 
but also increased alcohol-related 
crime and violence and under-18 
alcohol-specific hospital admissions. 
Also, where licensed premises are 
clustered together within an area 
they are more likely to compete on 
price and promotions which can 
lead to increased consumption and 
alcohol related injury and violence.82
The Newcastle SLP included the 
development of the Framework 
of Hours and Cumulative Impact 
Special Policy Decision matrix 
(7.9), which clearly articulates 
their position on opening 
hours and details the special 
policies that are applied in each 
case. By clearly stating what 
the suggested opening and 
closing hours are, and by using 
this as a focus for all licensing 
applications, responsible 
authorities ask the applicant 
to demonstrate that they 
will not add to the negative 
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cumulative impact in the area. 
In this way, Newcastle has been 
very successful in supporting 
and enforcing elements of 
their CIP. For example, very few 
off-premise licences have been 
granted since the policy was 
adopted.
Other strategic examples 
might include taking a holistic 
approach to the dispersal 
of crowds, with some areas 
ensuring that late night food 
services close at the same time 
as local nightclubs so that there 
is nowhere for crowds of people 
to gather. Late night takeaway 
or kebab shops can often act as 
a catalyst to violence and public 
disorder, but if late night food 
services are not open, people 
are more likely to go straight 
home. Some local governments 
have also used road closures 
or changed the position of taxi 
ranks to achieve similar ends, 
using their SLP as a method of 
explaining these actions and the 
way in which they can benefit 
a local area. Interlinked with 
their CIP, as mentioned above, 
Westminster City Council’s SLP 
sets out a clear and positive 
direction for how they want the 
local night time economy to 
grow, stating that:
The council wishes to discourage 
drunkenness and to encourage 
the provision of more seating in 
premises which serve alcohol for 
people to sit and enjoy a drink and 
order food by table service, in place 
of open bar space which caters 
for high volume vertical drinking. 
(Westminster City Council, SLP, para 
1.3)
This has had a positive impact 
in shaping the licensed trade 
away from drink-led venues 
and helped set a clear direction 
for the licensing committee. As 
mentioned, recent research has 
found that 93 per cent of the 
growth within Westminster’s 
West End Stress Area CIP over 
the last ten years was made up 
of food-led venues.83
Resource requirements /
implications
Development of SLPs can be 
resource intensive, particularly 
when effort is applied to ensure 
they are detailed and well 
evidenced. Licensing teams 
should engage with all the other 
Responsible Authorities (such 
as Police, Trading Standards), 
but engagement with public 
health teams is often particularly 
important as they have access to 
key data sources.
Local governments have a 
statutory list of bodies who need 
to be consulted on their SLP, 
which includes the local licensed 
trade, but there is considerable 
discretion as to how wide the 
public consultation has to 
be. Some have gone to great 
lengths in order to do this and 
public consultations do not have 
to be onerous to be effective. 
Some areas have run specific 
focus groups in order to get local 
views but, in many cases, there 
already exist local networks 
that can be used. In addition to 
a general public consultation, 
council officers could take a 
set of short questions to local 
groups and organisations 
in order to get their views 
on general licensing issues, 
encouraging anyone with more 
detailed ideas to fill in the full 
consultation.
An SLP that can be proved to 
be based on the views of local 
residents could be seen as 
carrying greater legal weight 
than one without this. While this 
requires additional time and 
political capital, some councils 
have also taken their SLP to a 
vote at full council in order to 
give it greater legitimacy and 
legal weight.
Political support for policy
SLPs are already legal 
requirements in England, Wales, 
and Scotland.
Policy mechanisms
The 2003 Licensing Act in 
England and Wales includes 
Statements of Licensing Policies 
as a requirement, as does the 
2005 Licensing Act in Scotland.
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SEPARATE LIQUOR AISLES IN SHOPS AND SUPERMARKETS
In Australia, there are two main 
approaches to the regulation 
of the physical placement of 
alcohol within supermarkets. 
First, some jurisdictions do 
not allow alcohol to be sold in 
supermarkets at all. Second, 
some jurisdictions allow alcohol 
to be sold in supermarkets but 
with a range of conditions, such 
as requirements that alcohol is 
displayed in separate sections 
or aisles.
Tasmania, Queensland, and 
South Australia prohibit the sale 
of alcohol within supermarkets. 
In the 2016 review of South 
Australia’s liquor law, the 
continued separation of alcohol 
from other products was 
recommended on the basis 
that “it is inconsistent with 
principles of harm minimisation 
to have liquor displayed in the 
same shelves as ordinary food 
stuffs”.84 Conversely, the 2015 
Harper Competition Review85 
recommended the restrictions 
preventing supermarkets from 
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT? Requires separation of alcohol from other items in supermarkets, while not requiring 
separate checkouts for the sale of alcohol.
POLICY SCORE: 6 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Relatively low burden on regulators and businesses.
• Distinguishes alcohol from other products to reduce the extent to which shoppers 
consider alcohol as part of their normal shop.
• Likely to reduce impulse purchasing by reducing the availability of alcohol, both physical 
and psychological.
CONS: • Politically controversial.
• Limited evidence to support effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related harm.
selling liquor be reviewed. 
At the same time, the review 
recommended continuation 
of the public interest test, 
that policy should not restrict 
competition unless the 
benefits of the restriction to 
the community as a whole 
outweigh the costs.86
Alcohol can be sold in 
supermarkets in the ACT, 
Victoria, and NSW, with varying 
requirements stipulated in 
the Liquor Acts (NSW and 
Victoria) or regulations 
(ACT). Supermarkets are not 
mentioned in Western Australia 
or Northern Territory legislation. 
All three jurisdictions specify 
that liquor sold under a 
packaged liquor licence in 
premises where the primary 
business is not the sale of 
liquor (such as a supermarket, 
as specified in the ACT and 
Victoria), must be contained 
in a separate liquor sales 
area. Victoria further specifies 
that liquor can be sold at any 
checkout provided the person 
receiving payment is 18 years of 
age or more, subject to licence-
specific conditions. Despite 
these legislative requirements, 
instances have been observed 
where alcohol that was once 
restricted to particular aisles or 
areas becomes available across 
the store.87 This development 
continues to attract attention: 88
German behemoth Aldi, as 
well as some IGA stores, have 
gone furthest in blurring the 
line between the aisle and 
alcohol. Aldi sells liquor not 
from attached bottle shops, 
but from dedicated zones 
within the main part of the 
store. Purchases can be made 
through a standard register 
so you can buy your beer and 
broccoli in one transaction. 
A spokesman for the NSW 
Independent Liquor and 
Gaming Authority said there 
was nothing to stop any grocery 
store from selling liquor in the 
main portion of the store so 
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long as there was some form of 
separation from the rest of the 
store, that sales staff were over 
18 and had proper training. 
Dedicated cash registers were 
usual but not demanded. Coles 
and Woolworths — whose 
Liquorland, BWS and Dan 
Murphy’s brands dominate 
Australia’s takeaway liquor 
market — still insist on 
banishing booze to a separate 
shop.
Evidence of impact
While no apparent research has 
demonstrated alcohol-related 
harm reduction associated with 
separations of liquor aisles in 
Australia, similar restrictions in 
Scotland have been found to be 
effective. In Scotland, the 2010 
Alcohol Act (Scotland) forced 
off-licences to limit alcohol and 
alcohol-related products to one 
part of the store, introduced 
bans on multi-buy discounts, 
and extended ‘happy-hour’ 
restrictions to off-licences.89 
Researchers have examined 
the contrasting situations 
in England and Scotland. In 
England, researchers found 
that alcohol promotions 
were routinely placed in the 
supermarket entrance – often 
in the form of stacks of boxed 
beers, lagers and cider.90 In 
this way, the importance of 
dispersing alcohol displays 
in order to increase sales 
has been recognised by the 
drinks industry. By contrast, in 
Scotland, licensing legislation 
requires displays of alcohol to 
be confined to a single area of 
the store. This is in response 
to a growing concern that 
alcohol displays on the ends 
of aisles, directly inside the 
shop doorway and next to 
everyday groceries, encourage 
consumers to think of alcohol as 
an ordinary commodity, rather 
than a potentially harmful 
drug.91
Resource requirements/
implications
In Victoria, the seller of liquor 
products must be “of or over 
the age of 18 years” but not 
all states have the same 
requirements. For example, in 
Tasmania, there is a minimum 
age requirement of 16 years 
to serve alcohol as part of 
employment.
All states and territories in 
Australia require Responsible 
Service of Alcohol (RSA) training 
for employees who supply or 
sell alcohol. One can speculate 
that this training requirement 
might lead stores to want to 
concentrate alcohol sales into 
one area.
It is not known what resources 
are dedicated to ensuring RSA 
training is undertaken in the 
supermarket context.
Political support for policy
As outlined in the discussion 
above, this policy, even 
where implemented, is 
being challenged by the 
supermarket industry – 
especially those other than the 
big two in Australia (Coles and 
Woolworths), which do not 
have access to dedicated ‘liquor 
barns’. 
Policy mechanisms
This requirement is currently being 
met through a combination of the 
relevant acts and regulations.
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Licensing decisions in Australia 
traditionally took into account – 
whether formally or de facto – a 
dimension of ‘community need’ 
in deciding on new licences. 
However, the drift towards 
deregulation and a liberal 
economic policy, manifesting itself 
in the National Competition Policy, 
has negated the consideration of 
existing levels of alcohol availability 
in licensing decisions. More 
recently, moves toward legislating 
consideration of community 
impact in licensing decisions, 
and the embeddedness of ‘harm 
minimisation’ as an aim in the laws 
governing the licensing regime,92 
represents a step back from the 
previous trends.
The need for liquor licensing 
decisions to consider the interests 
of the community, or some 
variation of that terminology, is 
specified in the Liquor Acts of all 
Australian states and territories. 
Two states, New South Wales 
and Queensland, have gone 
further by requiring a community 
impact statement (CIS) be 
considered when assessing licence 
applications. In Western Australia, 
a public interest assessment (PIA) 
is required. A similar approach 
is under consideration in South 
Australia.93 These statements share 
the function of canvassing views of 
the local community and making 
the deciding authority aware of the 
results of discussions between the 
applicant and local community.94
Uniquely, the Western Australian 
process asks applicants to 
demonstrate the positive aspects 
(including the social, economic, 
and health impacts), noting, “it 
is not sufficient for applicants to 
merely demonstrate that the grant 
of the application will not have any 
negative impact”.95 Typically, this 
process has two levels with a more 
stringent requirement for hotels, 
clubs, and packaged liquor stores 
or licences deemed higher risk, 
and a lesser requirement for select 
lower risk licence types.
Criticisms of the CIS in NSW have 
related to its use of templates,96 
including that they encourage the 
presentation of irrelevant material 
and the omission of other relevant 
material. One commentator 
noted, “there is no such thing as 
a definitive list of impact issues 
that will cover every eventuality 
and local circumstance”.97 Despite 
this, the need for a comprehensive 
guide to facilitate greater 
community engagement has been 
highlighted. 
Evidence of impact
There are two levels of potential 
impact that can be researched. First, 
whether the use of a CIS process 
increases community engagement 
in the liquor licensing application 
process, and second, whether the 
use of a CIS process achieves the 
aim of harm minimisation. 
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT? All liquor licensing decisions need to consider interests of the community
POLICY SCORE: 5 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Provides opportunity for community input to licensing decisions.
• Allows merits of each proposed venue to be considered on an individual basis.
• Agreeable to stakeholders and community.
CONS: 
• Opposition to new licensed venues needs to be reiterated for each new application, 
rather than establishing long-term policies in a region.
• Considerable resource burden to both applicants and opponents.
• Limited requirements for community consultation, with failure to object considered as 
passive endorsement. 
• Local government considered to represent residents’ interests, with parties increasingly 
excluded for deliberations unless specifically invited by the licensing authority.
COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
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The CIS system in NSW has 
been criticised on the basis that 
it involves only limited public 
notification and community 
consultation.98 Formal 
requirements are limited and any 
suggestion of wider discretionary 
consultation would not be in the 
interests of the applicant. This may 
affect community stakeholders’ 
awareness of a licence application 
and their opportunities to provide 
input to the process.99 Failure 
to comment or object to an 
application is taken as a passive 
endorsement, which is also a 
weakness of the system. The 
information included in a CIS is also 
narrow in scope.100 For example, a 
CIS does not include information 
on the impact of the proposed 
licence on outlet density, socio-
demographic characteristics of the 
community, or the incidence of 
alcohol-related harm in the local 
area.
In relation to the second level 
of evidence, Livingston et al. 
found there is “no evaluation 
research on what difference these 
arrangements [such as a CIS] might 
make in terms of licence refusal 
rates, condition setting or whether 
these processes can make a strong 
and discernible contribution to 
reducing alcohol-related harm”.101 
Despite this, the usefulness of 
public interest tests as a regulatory 
instrument in the liquor licensing 
system was recognised in the 
South Australian Liquor Act 
review, which recommended their 
implementation.102
Resource requirements/
implications
Jurisdictions must commit a 
considerable amount of resources 
to impact assessment policies. 
Resources are required to 
develop guides for community 
members to participate in the CIS/
PIA process, and the process of 
assessing submissions presents an 
ongoing administrative burden. 
It is not known how much of 
each jurisdiction’s resources are 
dedicated to these tasks.
The CIS process is also subject 
to resource limitations from the 
perspective of the community 
participants, between “heavy 
research requirements to meet the 
onus of proof; a need to quickly 
develop a community network 
that shares the concern; the costs 
of participation; and the lack of 
access to independent advice”.103
In Western Australia, the 2013 
Review of the Liquor Control Act 
1988 noted the potential for 
confusion and frustration when 
preparing a PIA was high (5:77). 
Even better resourced businesses 
wishing to apply for a liquor licence 
often find that the preparation 
of the CIS or PIA is onerous and 
choose to engage consulting 
companies to undertake this task. 
For example, in the 2013 Review 
of the WA Liquor Control Act 1988 
(p.77) it was noted that:
The Director has a policy titled 
Public Interest Assessment which 
assists applicants in the preparation 
of a public interest assessment 
submission. While detailed and 
comprehensive the policy is not 
designed to guide an applicant 
through the process. The potential 
for confusion and frustration is 
therefore high. A more user friendly 
and comprehensive guide would 
reduce frustration, enable more 
efficient use of resources and would 
be more likely to satisfy community 
and industry expectations.
In this regard the Committee 
considers the licensing authority 
should develop a comprehensive 
Code of Practice to assist applicants 
in preparing a public interest 
assessment to replace the existing 
public interest assessment policy 
and should undertake a review 
of all other policies, guidelines, 
fact sheets and other material, 
in conjunction with industry, to 
ensure they are accurate, relevant 
and are meeting the needs of users.
Political support for policy
The need to consider community 
perspectives in liquor licensing 
decisions is widely recognised. 
However, frustrations associated 
with aspects of how impact 
assessment policies have been 
implemented in some jurisdictions 
may increase resistance to their 
introduction elsewhere. These 
include, for example, the use of 
restrictive templates and limited 
public consultation.
Policy mechanisms
Community impact statements 
are specifically mentioned in the 
Liquor Act 2007 (NSW) and the 
Liquor Act 1992 (Queensland). 
The Government of Western 
Australia’s Department of Racing, 
Gaming and Liquor has issued a 
Policy Guideline concerning public 
interest assessment, which they 
state is “Pursuant to section 38 of 
the Liquor Control Act 1988”.104 
However, the need for more 
resources to support community 
members through the process has 
been noted.
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Background
There is strong evidence 
that alcohol outlet density is 
associated with increased alcohol-
related harm.150,106 However, the 
precise relationship is often very 
context-specific and mediated 
by other key factors such as the 
affordability of alcohol and the 
socioeconomic composition of 
the neighbourhood. 
The UK appears to have greater 
alcohol outlet density than similar 
other countries, such as Australia 
and the United States (see Figure 
3). As a result, there may need to 
be a reduction in outlet density 
of as much as ten per cent before 
there would be any noticeable 
impact on alcohol-related harm.107 
Such high outlet density presents 
a serious concern in light of the 
positive relationship between 
outlet density and alcohol-related 
harm, and examples of the 
positive impact of reducing outlet 
density in Scotland suggest that 
addressing outlet density has the 
potential to deliver substantial 
harm reduction in other areas.108
REGION YEAR OUTLET COUNT ADULT POPULATION OUTLETS PER 1,000 ADULTS
United Kingdom
England and Wales 2010 199,449 43,799,893 4.6
Scotland 2011-12 16,157 4,257,900 3.8
United States of America 2005 - - 2.7
Australia
Victoria 2011 11,312 4,316,224 2.6
Western Australia 2011 2,147 1,809,421 1.2
New South Wales 2011 13,347 5,576,862 2.4
Northern Territory 2011 474 169,198 2.8
Queensland 2011 6,624 3,405,462 1.9
Foster. J., Charalambides. L., (2016). The Licensing Act (2003): its uses and abuses 10 years on. Institute of Alcohol Studies. Retrieved from: http://www.ias.
org.uk/uploads/pdf/IAS%20reports/rp22032016.pdf 
White, V., Coomber, D., Azar, D., Balint, A., Chikritzhs, T., Gilmore, W., Livingston, M., Room, R., Durkin, S. & Wakefield, M. (n.p.). The number and density 
of four main types of alcohol licences in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia. Technical Report Number 1. 
Cancer Council Victoria.
Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2017). Catalogue Number 3101.0 - Australian Demographic Statistics, Sep 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.abs.gov.
au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0
FIGURE 3: INTERNATIONAL ALCOHOL OUTLET DENSITY COMPARISON
Limits on the spatial availability 
of alcohol are not new. The 
Licensing Act (2003) abolished 
the concept of ‘need’, which 
had operated under the 
former licensing regime in 
England and Wales, where 
magistrates were able to limit 
the number of premises based 
on local ‘need’. While applied in 
a patchy manner, the ability of 
magistrates to limit density on 
this basis was seen by sections 
of the licensed trade as anti-
business and incompatible with 
an entirely free market.109
The principle of need was 
phased out in the early 
1990s, before being officially 
ended with the introduction 
of the Licensing Act (2003). 
Market forces have now 
made the licensing process 
less discretionary and more 
administrative, something 
accentuated by the impact 
of competition law and the 
European Union (EU). The 
situation in Australia is similar, 
DISCUSSION OF SPATIAL POLICIES
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with the concept of ‘community 
need’ having apparently been 
placed to one side in favour of a 
free market approach.
Such frameworks limit the use of 
policy mechanisms to regulate 
outlet density. It is notable that 
cumulative impact policies 
(CIPs) and statement of licensing 
policies (SLPs) in England 
and Wales, and the principle 
of overprovision in Scotland, 
cannot be regarded as absolute 
policies. Rather, all must be 
applied in a way that allows 
individual cases to be judged on 
their own merits in keeping with 
this free market approach. While 
some advocate a free market 
approach to liquor trade on 
economic grounds, this fails to 
consider externalities that arise 
through the harm caused by 
alcohol. That is, the current free 
market approach fails to hold 
businesses liable for the true 
cost of liquor sales, including 
the costs imposed on the public 
by short and long-term harm to 
both drinkers and third parties. 
From an economic perspective, 
this presents a market failure 
through negative externalities.
Spatial policies may be used 
to regulate the availability 
of alcohol, primarily through 
influencing the prevalence of 
licensed trade outlets. Factors 
influencing the effectiveness 
of such policies include the 
extent to which they empower 
licensing and the community to 
oppose applications and their 
ability to impose restrictions to 
minimise risk where applications 
are deemed appropriate. The 
longevity of policies also plays 
an important role. Policies that 
impose consistent standards 
on licensing considerations 
reduce administrative burden by 
removing the need to reiterate 
opposition for each new 
application. 
Effectiveness at refusing 
unsuitable applications
The use of spatial policy tools 
in the UK varies between 
regions. However, the fact that 
only around three per cent 
of licence applications are 
rejected in England and Wales 
suggests neither SLPs nor CIPs 
are particularly effective in 
strengthening the ability to 
refuse unsuitable applications. 
This is primarily to do with the 
market-based assumptions 
within the Licensing Act (2003) 
and the fact that many local 
governments do not use the Act 
in a proactive manner.
Licensing decisions are taken 
on a case-by-case basis, and are 
determined on their own facts 
and circumstances. However, 
a key concern relating to the 
2003 Licensing Act is that it 
often does not adequately serve 
the wider public interest. This 
public interest purpose can, and 
should, be highlighted in the 
SLP and make its way into each 
licensing decision through this 
document. If properly evidenced 
and used in this way, SLPs can 
be used to shape licensed trade 
in ways beneficial for the local 
community as a whole.
Despite this, SLPs are often 
operationally weak, and 
evidence from the case studies 
suggests other licensing tools 
such as licensing forums in 
Scotland and the community 
impact statement (CIS) in 
Australia also fall into this 
category. While these policies 
aim to better involve local 
communities in licensing 
processes, they do not appear to 
have achieved this. Analysis of 
the CIS in NSW show the system 
involves weak consultation and 
investigation requirements for 
applicants, which raises doubts 
as to the quality of information 
on which regulators base their 
decisions. Problems are different 
for licensing forums, but result in 
similarly poor outcomes. Forums 
often have an unclear role and 
remit, and many have strong 
representation from the licensed 
trade, which has been identified 
as a barrier to effective and 
coherent action.110
Similarly, CIPs are also 
operationally weak, as they do 
not allow local governments 
to control the number of 
premises in an area. This is 
despite the fact that density 
of premises is recognised as 
a potential problem in formal 
guidance relating to the CIPs 
(at para 13.21 of the Section 
182 Guidance).111 However, 
CIPs do have advantages and 
can give local governments 
greater discretion to turn down 
unsuitable applications. They 
can also act as a deterrent to less 
socially responsible retailers by 
making a clear statement that 
the negative impact of alcohol 
is taken particularly seriously 
within the CIP area.
Another weakness in the 
application of spatial policies, 
and the CIS in particular, are the 
exemptions provided to certain 
venue types. For example, 
small bars are not required 
to prepare a CIS in NSW if the 
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venue required development 
approval. While this exemption 
may be intended to reduce the 
regulatory burden on small 
businesses, it restricts the scope 
for community consultation 
in licensing decisions. This 
fails to acknowledge the fact 
that alcohol is not an ordinary 
commodity, and its supply must 
be regulated above and beyond 
other products. In addition, 
while this exemption is applied 
on the assumption that small 
bars inherently pose less risk, it 
does not recognise that density 
may present risks irrespective of 
outlet sizes. 
With increasing pressure to 
reduce regulatory burden, 
such as under the Australian 
Government’s Cutting Red 
Tape agenda,112 regulatory 
exemptions to liquor licensing 
may become more widespread 
in future. Broadening the 
definition of categories receiving 
exemptions, such as recent 
proposals to increase the venue 
capacity for small bars in NSW,113 
also presents risks through 
providing regulatory exemptions 
to a larger number of venues.
Newcastle, in the north of 
England, cites both CIPs and 
the Framework of Hours 
contained in the city’s SLP as 
having contributed to success 
in restricting the growth of 
the off-trade in certain areas. 
Of particular interest is the 
way Newcastle has taken an 
innovative wellbeing-orientated 
approach within their SLP, 
mapping wellbeing-related 
issues such as deprivation, crime 
data, and the overall availability 
of alcohol, and introducing 
CIPs in certain areas to ensure 
new premises do not impact 
negatively on these issues. 
CIP policies in Newcastle also 
place emphasis on the views 
of local residents. For example, 
within the SLP one of the CIP 
area details mentioned that:
Outside of the City Centre, Elswick 
area has the highest off licence 
outlet density in Newcastle and 
residents have told us that there are 
too many shops selling alcohol in 
the area. Local data and concerns 
raised by residents show that there 
are issues related to alcohol related 
crime, underage drinking, youth 
related anti-social behaviour and 
street drinking by adult drinkers 
who visit or live in the hostels in 
the area. The area also has a high 
prevalence of other alcohol related 
issues such as alcohol related 
attendances at the emergency 
department and domestic 
violence.114
While this approach is relatively 
common, Newcastle has 
strengthened such policies 
by taking a broader view of 
the negative social impacts of 
alcohol while clearly evidencing 
their link to the licensing 
objectives. Reportedly, the 
Framework of Hours and 
Cumulative Impact Special 
Policy Decision matrix have also 
been successful in ensuring the 
applicant demonstrates that 
they will not add to the negative 
cumulative impact in the area. 
There could be overlap between 
this resident-focused approach 
and the CIS, if CISs involved 
more significant consultation 
with local communities and 
provided greater detail on the 
potential local impacts of an 
application.
Ability to mitigate risks where 
deemed appropriate
While CIPs may be used to limit 
outlet growth, their primary 
benefit seems to be as a ‘place 
shaping’ device. The successes 
some local governments have 
had demonstrate that reducing 
the availability of alcohol does 
not necessarily involve closing 
venues or preventing them from 
opening. Influencing temporal 
availability and the terminal 
hour is often a key factor, 
particularly for the emergency 
services,115 and CIPs can be 
effective at this. As Westminster 
has shown, steering an area 
away from high volume vertical 
drinking establishments towards 
food-led venues can help to 
limit problems while supporting 
the continued viability of the 
licensed trade. The case study 
on temporal availability also 
highlights how restrictions 
in terminal hour in parts of 
Australia have diversified local 
markets, supporting growth 
within the licensed trade and 
among other businesses.
If strengthened, CISs in Australia 
could be used in a similar 
manner, given that they place a 
responsibility on the applicant 
to communicate with the local 
community and consider the 
impact their venue may have 
upon the local area. There are 
regrettably no evaluations of 
the impact that CISs have on 
licensing decisions. It seems 
reasonable to assume that if 
conducted in a more thorough 
manner, with a genuine dialogue 
with the local community, 
CISs would probably have the 
potential to promote local 
interests over business interests 
ANYTIME, ANYPLACE, ANYWHERE? ADDRESSING PHYSICAL AVAILABILITY OF ALCOHOL IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UK
42
where these are conflicting. In 
a similar way to CIPs or SLPs, 
they may be used either to block 
unsuitable applications or shape 
them in a beneficial manner.
As with SLPs and CIPs, a key factor 
is likely to be not just the CIS and 
the way in which it is conducted, 
but the way it is factored into the 
decision-making process. If CISs are 
given significant weight and seen 
as a key factor in the decision, they 
would be far more likely to have a 
significant impact. However, this 
may vary from region to region.
Whether they last over time or 
need to be generated for each 
application
Another advantage of the 
SLP and CIP approach when 
compared to CISs is that 
once established, they have 
an ongoing influence on 
licensing decisions within their 
geographical remit. In contrast, 
CISs are one-off and application 
specific, even where community 
members would want to raise 
the same concerns with all 
similar applications within that 
particular area. This may lead to 
considerable time and financial 
burdens, and the duplication of 
work.
For this reason, ongoing policies 
similar to the spatial tools in the 
UK may provide councils with 
the opportunity to regulate 
new developments based on 
prevailing conditions in the 
region over a period of time. 
Such an approach provides 
greater power to communities 
to determine whether licence 
applications are appropriate 
for their region, and mitigate 
the time and cost associated 
with opposing individual 
applications. Depending on 
its design, such a policy may 
also improve the consistency 
of approach across regions, 
although this has not been the 
case in the UK.
Improving community voice
In the UK, licensing forums, 
SLPs, and CIPs each provide 
opportunities for local residents 
to provide input to licensing 
decisions. The situation is slightly 
different in Australia, where CISs 
are the primary vehicle through 
which residents may influence 
decisions. Even then, CIS 
policies (such as those in NSW) 
require consultation with only 
a select list of stakeholders, and 
local government councils are 
expected to accurately represent 
the interests of the residents. 
While there are notable 
exceptions, in general, it 
seems local residents struggle 
to have a significant impact 
on licensing, even where 
granting an application may 
reasonably be seen to lead to 
potential problems. Many of the 
potential barriers to community 
involvement appear to be 
common across the UK and 
Australia. These include being 
unaware of the application, a 
lack of accessible information 
and advice, small consultation 
time periods, difficulties 
navigating the licensing process, 
access to experts in licensing 
and planning policies, a lack of 
independent legal advice, and 
the influence of the licensed 
trade.
In Scotland, licensing standards 
officers (LSO) have a role to play 
in helping the public, providing 
guidance (but not legal advice) 
on the alcohol licensing process 
to them and licensed trade. 
This includes how to object 
to a licence. They mediate in 
low-level disputes between the 
public and the licensed trade 
and check that licensed premises 
are complying with the law. 
Similar to changes in this area 
made within England and Wales, 
LSOs seem to have improved 
community voice in some areas, 
but not to have made a very 
significant difference.
One possible change that 
could help to increase the 
effectiveness of public 
participation in licensing is for 
councils to provide legal advice 
for local residents. In London, 
Westminster Council has had 
great success with this approach. 
It funds a ‘Licensing Advice 
Project’ for local residents in 
conjunction with the Citizens 
Advice Westminster, and legal 
and practical help from this 
ensures that local residents 
make effective contributions. 
Replication of this elsewhere 
seems likely to be very beneficial 
and, under the Licensing Act 
(2003), could be legitimately 
factored into a licensing 
authority’s costs under locally 
set fees. Similarly, in Australia 
this could be factored into RBL 
fee systems.
Physical separation of alcohol 
in supermarkets
While it appears that no 
research has directly examined 
the impact on alcohol harm of 
separate aisles or checkouts for 
the sale of alcohol, evidence 
of a reduction in sales (and, 
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therefore, consumption) is 
likely to reflect a reduction in 
harm.116 There is evidence that 
placing alcohol throughout a 
supermarket drives additional 
sales, and it is known that 
placing alcohol at store 
entrances and on the end of 
aisles increases sales.117 Alcohol 
is also often found in the 
food section, with white wine 
strategically placed by the fish 
or beer next to crisps. Brewing 
company Carlsberg suggest that 
retailers should “create stacks of 
your promotional beers… site 
stacks away from the beer fixture 
to drive impulse purchase.”118 
That the industry actively seeks 
to promote impulsive purchases 
of alcohol presents risks of harm. 
Regulation to separate alcohol 
from other grocery products 
may mitigate the risk that 
alcohol becomes normalised as 
part of a regular shop and help 
to ensure customers’ decisions 
to purchase alcohol are not 
influenced by its prominence 
in the store. In this way, 
separation of alcohol products 
in supermarkets presents a 
relatively simple way to reduce 
its psychological and physical 
availability without causing 
onerous burdens on businesses 
or affecting the ability for 
consumers to purchase alcohol 
conveniently.
Summary
When used effectively, spatial 
policies may be used to 
influence the way in which 
the licensed trade develops in 
a given area, shaping growth 
towards business models that 
present less risk of alcohol-
related harm. However, with 
some exceptions, existing 
policies have rarely enabled 
opponents to prevent new 
venues opening. In addition, 
policies that require an objection 
to each separate application 
(such as CISs) are onerous to 
both business owners and 
those opposing new venues. 
Policies that provide a consistent 
framework based on the needs 
of the community, such as 
CIPs and SLPs, allow licensing 
authorities to regulate alcohol 
availability while presenting less 
burden to businesses and the 
public.
Given the impact and potential 
harm presented by new licensed 
venues, it is important that the 
views and concerns of local 
residents are considered in 
licensing decisions. Effectively 
harnessing the views and 
concerns of local residents is 
important in facilitating effective 
spatial policies, and can be 
encouraged by better informing 
the public about appeal 
processes and their rights. 
With respect to the physical 
separation of alcohol products, 
the available evidence suggests 
restrictions on alcohol location 
within stores would have some 
impact on overall consumption 
and, therefore, result in a 
reduction of alcohol-related 
harm. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Lessons for the UK:
If used strategically and with good local detail, SLPs offer opportunities to influence the spatial availability 
of alcohol. In practice, the application of SLPs is often quite weak however. Better equipping communities 
with knowledge and resources to effectively oppose unsuitable licences is likely to improve community 
involvement.
England and Wales may learn from the separation of alcohol products in supermarkets in a number of 
Australian jurisdictions. Evidence regarding the efficacy of such measures is more established in Scotland, 
however, where research has identified a reduction in consumption associated with supermarket policies.
Lessons for Australia:
Australian policy may benefit from spatial policies more aligned with SLPs, which can work in a similar 
manner to CISs but remain in place over time rather than being reproduced for each new application. CIPs 
also offer greater discretion for local governments in problem areas. As for England and Wales, greater 
restrictions on off-trade marketing is also likely to have a positive impact.
RECOMMENDATIONS
3. Improve regulation of off-licence liquor sales
Confine alcohol to specific areas within supermarkets to discourage impulse purchases and reduce alcohol 
sales.
4. Enhance community involvement
Provide residents with access to legal resources and advice to ensure that the community is able to engage with 
licensing systems.
5. Clearly define licensing policy to minimise the cumulative harm associated with higher densities of  
     liquor outlets
Develop comprehensive policies for how licensing legislation should be implemented, including protecting 
local communities by applying controls on outlet density.
HARM MINIMISATION
AND USE OF DATA
COMPARING AND DISCUSSING:
PUBLIC HEALTH AS A LICENSING OBJECTIVE
HARM MINIMISATION AS A PRIMARY OBJECT
ANONYMOUS DATA SHARING: THE CARDIFF MODEL
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PUBLIC HEALTH AS A LICENSING OBJECTIVE
Despite being separate pieces 
of legislation, the Licensing 
Act (2003) and the Licensing 
Act (Scotland) 2005 share four 
licensing objectives:
 ● the prevention of crime and 
disorder
 ● public safety
 ● the prevention of public 
nuisance
 ● the protection of children from 
harm.
The Licensing Act (Scotland) 2005 
also includes a fifth objective: 
to protect and improve public 
health.
The use of an overprovision 
policy is probably the most 
obvious method for licensing 
boards to uphold this fifth 
objective, but there are 
other wider factors, such as 
influencing licensing hours 
for example. As with the other 
objectives, decisions based on 
the fifth objective need to be 
made on a sound evidential 
basis and in keeping with the 
provisions of the Act.119 
There can be tension and 
misunderstanding about the 
promotion of the public health 
objective, as it can be difficult 
to evidence health-related 
problems as originating from 
any one premises. However, 
evidence about alcohol-related 
harm is generally available at a 
wider population level. This can 
be incorporated into a licensing 
board’s SLP, with applications 
potentially refused if they are 
shown to be contrary to the 
SLP120 (see the SLP case study for 
more).
This change to a policy-led 
process, involving a wider 
consideration of evidence and 
the impact alcohol may have in 
an area over time, has not been 
without its problems. Many 
report conflicts between a more 
administrative and proximal 
view of licensing, as taken by 
many licensing officers, and the 
population level concerns of 
public health that tend to occur 
across far larger periods of time 
and geography. 
These differing perspectives 
tend to rely on different types 
of evidence. More traditional 
licensing officers focus on 
issues and evidence closer to 
the sale and consumption of 
alcohol, while public health 
uses longer-term evidence 
from epidemiological studies 
that describe the impact of 
continued alcohol consumption 
over time. Given the way 
in which the Licensing Act 
(Scotland) 2005 works, with the 
need to establish (although 
not always to definitively 
prove as commonly believed) 
a link between a premise 
and a problem, proximal 
evidence tends to be applied 
more effectively whereas 
epidemiological evidence is 
often more difficult, particularly 
if not backed up with more 
locally specific data. 
Some public health practitioners 
have been overly keen to use 
international academic data 
LOCATION: Scotland
WHAT IS IT? A specific objective within the Licensing Act (2005) Scotland which makes ‘Protecting and 
improving public health’ a consideration within licensing decisions.
POLICY SCORE: 5 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• It expands the issues which can be taken into account within licensing to better reflect 
the impact of alcohol consumption. 
• It has successfully changed the context within which licensing operates.
CONS: • It has proven difficult to operationalize this objective.
• Its impact at a local level has so far been difficult to quantify. 
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within licensing hearings, 
such as peer-reviewed studies 
indicating a link between the 
density of premises and a range 
of negative outcomes. While 
these can be both informative 
and interesting, they do not 
necessarily count as ‘evidence’ 
within a licensing hearing, where 
material fact directly linked to 
the particular case in question is 
likely to be far more persuasive. 
This is not to say that 
such academic research is 
inadmissible as evidence. 
However, those who use it well 
tend to use research to provide 
a broader context to licensing 
policy or individual applications, 
while providing more detailed 
and localised evidence of 
alcohol harm. Local data is far 
more effective at influencing 
licensing decisions. This is a 
point of real frustration for many 
of those in public health, who 
see academic research as both 
useful and at times compelling 
but are not necessarily able 
to use it as ‘evidence’ before 
a licensing committee. This is 
reflected in the wider literature 
on this issue,121 with Martineau 
et al. (2013) commenting that: 
Broadening the scope of alcohol 
control frameworks to explicitly 
address health concerns does 
not change the underlying legal 
principles governing individual 
licensing decision. Health evidence 
needs to be legally relevant as well 
as scientifically valid.122 
This limitation has resulted in 
difficulties, with some public 
health communities in Scotland 
becoming frustrated at the 
working of the licensing system 
itself. One contributing factor 
here may be that some from 
public health started with overly 
optimistic expectations as to 
the impact they would have on 
longer-term health issues via 
licensing, when in fact, other 
interventions, such as pricing 
policy, are probably more 
effective for these issues. 
Despite the fact that there is 
no specific health objective 
within licensing legislation in 
England and Wales, health is a 
responsible authority under the 
Act and is becoming increasingly 
engaged in licensing. Health 
concerns must relate to the 
existing four objectives, and 
many of the same frustrations 
around evidence mentioned 
similarly apply. The biggest 
difference here is that in the 
absence of a health objective, 
representatives from public 
health have been less optimistic 
about their ability to influence 
licensing decisions. In hindsight, 
this more cautious approach 
has perhaps been useful, with 
some areas successfully taking 
health concerns into account in 
licensing decisions. 
Evidence of impact
Relevant local data and its 
accessible presentation 
within licensing decisions are 
fundamental to effectively 
incorporating public health 
objectives into legislation and 
licensing decisions. A recent 
report from NHS Scotland found 
the public health objective, 
and requirement to produce 
overprovision statements, have 
influenced licensing practice but 
been difficult to operationalise. 
It reported that it was not 
possible to determine if these 
changes were impacting upon 
licensing decisions or the 
general availability of alcohol, 
and pointed towards data as a 
particular limitation.123
Research into the views of public 
health practitioners about the 
Scottish public health objective 
has suggested the law, from a 
public health perspective, is:
Operationally weak because it is 
insufficient for a council simply 
to say that it believes the interests 
of public health are best served 
by denying a licence. If public 
health is to be used as a reason for 
declining a licence application, a 
council must have good evidence 
that issuing a licence poses a risk 
to public health. That’s not easy to 
do.124
The actual impact of the 
changes in Scotland on their 
licensed premises may be similar 
to the way CIPs in England and 
Wales can be used to prevent, 
or at least slow, the propagation 
of licensed premises in 
certain areas. While this can 
have some impact in specific 
locations, the result is far from 
transformational when looked 
at overall. It is likely that, just 
as with CIP, the public health 
licensing objective is more often 
used, and more often effective, 
in areas where there is more 
significant alcohol-related harm. 
This means that its effect will be 
localised, and not necessarily 
universal.
Recent research into the 
Licensing Act (2003) concluded 
the existing framework means 
that more proximal health 
issues seem likely to be the 
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most actively addressed via 
licensing.125 By employing a 
bottom-up approach, examining 
shorter time periods and smaller 
regions, health concerns may be 
linked to local social, rather than 
physical, health issues in an area.
As a result, it may be useful to 
shift from focusing on traditional 
public health issues and 
physical health to social health 
issues, such as street drinking, 
excess noise and lack of sleep, 
domestic violence, and issues 
linked to deprivation. While 
these issues could arguably be 
included under other licensing 
objectives, the additional 
flexibility provided by the health 
objective creates greater scope 
for addressing them. Given the 
licensing objectives and the 
legal framework of both the 
Licensing Act (2003) and the 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005, 
these social concerns can be 
better applied and possibly 
provide an alternative route to 
addressing longer-term harms. 
This is very much the approach 
taken by local government in 
England and Wales who have 
been more innovative with 
public health and represents 
more of an evolution than a 
revolution in licensing.126
This does not mean however 
that a focus on more proximal 
issues could not be a proxy 
route to addressing longer-
term harms. Research has 
indicated local government in 
England and Wales with a more 
intensive licensing regime (for 
instance, those with more CIPs) 
experienced an additional five 
per cent reduction in alcohol-
related hospital admissions rates 
in 2015 compared with what 
would have been expected had 
these local areas had no active 
licensing policy in place.127
Resource requirements/
implications
Significant resources have 
been put towards better 
operationalising public health 
concerns within licensing in 
both Scotland and south of 
the border. At a local level, 
the collection and analysis of 
relevant local data is highly 
resource intensive. However, 
this is becoming easier as better 
technologies and processes are 
developed. Another key issue, 
which may relate more to time 
resources than physical expense, 
is better integration of licensing 
authorities and the public health 
field. While improvement has 
been seen in some areas, a 
considerable amount of work is 
still required. 
Political support for policy
While there has been some 
political opposition to the 
greater involvement of 
health within licensing in 
Scotland, this has not been a 
particular problem. Of more 
significance are the general 
misunderstandings about the 
way in which health issues 
might work within the licensing 
system, and the impact that a 
health objective may have on 
health outcomes. In England 
and Wales, health concerns have 
gained more traction within 
licensing systems in recent 
years. It is not unrealistic to 
expect that a health objective 
may be added to the Licensing 
Act (2003) at some point in the 
future, although there is a lack 
of political support for this at 
present. 
Policy mechanisms 
In Scotland, public health is 
already an objective in licensing 
legislation. However, primary 
legislation would be required in 
England and Wales to include 
a public health objective in the 
Licensing Act (2003). 
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When Craze and Norberry128 
studied liquor licensing 
legislation across different 
Australian jurisdictions in 1995, 
harm minimisation was only 
mentioned in their Queensland 
summary of objectives. By 2012, 
harm minimisation had been 
included in the formal objects 
of Liquor Acts in all states and 
territories except Tasmania 
(‘objects’ is a formal legislative 
term distinct from ‘objectives’).129 
This situation remains 
unchanged in 2016. The term 
‘harm minimisation’ in Australian 
liquor licensing legislation had 
its origins in the drug policy 
discourse, especially at the time 
of the rise in HIV in the early 
1980s which saw governments 
moving away from the traditional 
criminalisation of illicit drug use 
and towards more pragmatic 
harm reduction solutions such as 
needle exchanges.
Harm minimisation has not been 
given equal standing in all the Acts. 
For harm minimisation to be most 
effective it needs to be not just 
one statutory purpose but to be 
the primary purpose of the Act.130 
Harm minimisation is clearly stated 
as the primary object of the Act in 
Queensland and Victoria. Davoren 
and O’Brien (2014) note that for 
the ACT and Northern Territory, 
although harm minimisation is 
not expressly given primary status 
over the other objects, there is a 
basis in the text for making such an 
implication (that is, it is mentioned 
first). In the South Australian Act, 
harm minimisation is mentioned 
in the first section, but as one of 
several objects of equal standing. 
In the amendment bill developed 
following the review of Liquor 
Licensing Act 1997 (SA), alcohol 
harms are specifically defined 
and include domestic violence 
among other factors. Between 
2012 and 2016, a new subsection 
3(1)(f) was inserted in the South 
Australian Act that gives extra 
standing to harm minimisation 
as it seeks to “ensure that the sale 
and supply of liquor occurs in 
such a manner as to minimise the 
risk of intoxication and associated 
violent or anti-social behaviour 
including property damage and 
causing personal injury”. However, 
this is not sufficient to make 
harm minimisation the primary 
object. In Western Australia, harm 
minimisation is mentioned as one 
of the primary objects of the Act, 
but it is mentioned second after 
the need to “regulate the sale, 
supply and consumption of liquor” 
(s. 5(1)(a)).
In Victoria alone, the primacy of 
harm minimisation as an object 
of the Act is bolstered by an 
additional clause, Section 4(2), 
inserted in 2009 which reads:
It is the intention of Parliament 
that every power, authority, 
discretion, jurisdiction and 
duty conferred or imposed by 
this Act must be exercised and 
performed with due regard to 
harm minimisation and the risks 
associated with the misuse and 
abuse of alcohol.
HARM MINIMISATION AS A PRIMARY OBJECT
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT? Elevation of harm minimisation to the primary object of liquor licensing legislation, 
whereby it is considered as a higher priority than other objectives.
POLICY SCORE: 6 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Supports licensing decisions in the interest of reducing alcohol-related harm.
• Clearly articulates priorities where a conflict exists between business interests, and 
public health and wellbeing.
CONS: 
• Even with harm minimisation as the primary object, licensing authorities may still allow 
increases to the availability of alcohol.
• Resource burden presented by the need for a review of liquor acts to elevate harm 
minimisation as the primary object, and in interpretation of harm minimisation in 
licensing decisions.
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A further discussion about the 
impact of having this extra clause 
is included below.
The only Australian jurisdiction 
where harm minimisation does 
not receive primary object status 
or primary status with other 
objects of equal standing is NSW 
(other than Tasmania, which does 
not have any objects in its Act). 
NSW prioritises liquor industry 
needs but notes that securing 
the objects of the Act is required 
to have due regard to harm 
minimisation.
Evidence of impact
Evidence of the impact of 
including harm minimisation, 
in terms of actual reductions 
in alcohol-related harm 
experienced, is difficult to 
measure given the complexity 
and multi-faceted nature of the 
alcohol policy landscape. What 
is more accessible is evidence 
of whether the inclusion of 
harm minimisation as an object 
in the Acts has had an impact 
on outcomes of challenges to 
liquor licensing applications. This 
section will concentrate on that 
assessment.
Manton131 analysed the outcomes 
of 50 cases relating to objections 
to liquor licensing applications 
or complaints about licensees, 
selecting the ten most recent 
review cases available for 
examination in late 2012 in South 
Australia, Queensland, Western 
Australia, NSW, and Victoria. 
She found that public interest, 
including harm minimisation, 
arguments did not appear to alter 
the outcome of challenges to 
liquor licensing decisions, although 
sometimes extra conditions for 
amenity-related issues such as 
noise and disturbance might 
be included. The most likely 
jurisdiction to refuse liquor licence 
applications (and with decisions 
upheld at subsequent reviews) 
was Western Australia. Harm 
minimisation was commonly 
advanced as an argument, along 
with amenity-related arguments, 
but overwhelmingly the liquor 
licence applications were rejected 
on the basis that they failed to 
demonstrate their application 
was in the public interest. She 
concluded that “to achieve 
the public interest objective of 
harm minimisation, other states 
and territories should consider 
adopting Western Australia’s 
reversal of the burden of proof”.132
There is one outstanding 
example to the contrary in 
Victoria as documented by 
Davoren and O’Brien.133 They 
examined how the object of 
harm minimisation was judicially 
considered in the Kordister case:
In the course of its decision, the 
Court of Appeal confirmed that the 
Victorian Parliament intended that 
harm minimisation should be the 
primary object of the Victorian Act 
(1: paras 19, 188). […] the harm 
minimisation object in s. 4(1)(a) is 
augmented by s. 4(2), making harm 
minimisation the primary purpose. 
Where harm minimisation is not 
just one statutory purpose but is 
the primary purpose, minimising 
harm from alcohol becomes 
the ‘fundamental principle’ 
on which the liquor licensing 
legislation rests—it is the ‘primary 
consideration’ in making decisions 
under the legislation and ‘a value 
which informs and guides the 
whole Act’ (1: paras 19, 188).
However, in trying to apply 
this, the courts have noted the 
complexity of the concept of 
harm minimisation.134 Much of 
the basis of the appeals and 
subsequent initial overturning of 
the original ruling was based on 
understanding the interpretation 
of the harm minimisation 
concept, including the scope 
of admissible evidence. The 
appeals judgment clarified that 
three types of evidence could be 
submitted relating to the risks of 
alcohol-related harm – general 
population evidence, locality 
evidence, as well as specific 
incident evidence. These warrant 
a more detailed investigation.
The first category relates to 
“general evidence about the use 
and misuse of alcohol”, which 
may include academic studies on 
how licensed premises impact on 
their local area or local strategic 
plans. The Court of Appeal made 
it clear it is unlikely general 
evidence would be enough on its 
own to reject an application on 
harm minimisation grounds.135
The second category deals with 
locality evidence, which is by 
definition linked to the “particular 
local, social, demographic or 
geographical circumstances of 
the relevant premises”. Possible 
examples might include evidence 
of alcohol-related violence 
or antisocial behaviour in the 
locality in question. The Court 
of Appeal was clear that there 
does not need to be an obvious 
causal link between the problems 
evidenced and the licensed 
premises. 
The third category of evidence 
involves specific incidents of the 
wrongful operation of a licensed 
FOUNDATION FOR ALCOHOL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION & THE INSTITUTE OF ALCOHOL STUDIES   
51
premise. This, by definition, 
does have to establish a causal 
link between a harm and the 
premises in question. 
It is not necessary for all 
three types of evidence to be 
presented for a decision to 
be made. In fact, the Court of 
Appeal stated that in some 
circumstances “the locality 
evidence may have such 
probative value that there is no 
need for reliance upon specific 
incidents”.136 This approach to 
evidence makes a lot of sense 
and would allow both those with 
a focus on short-term problems 
and long-term harm to place 
their preferred evidence within 
the framework. The relevance 
of licensing to the particular 
problem or harm in question 
would then be up to those 
committee members making the 
decision, guided by the principles 
of the licensing regime they 
operate under.
The Kordister case is something 
of a landmark but it is not clear 
that, even in the same state, it 
offers a precedent that sets an 
unambiguous direction for future 
cases. A 104-page 2016 decision 
by the Victorian Commission 
for Gambling and Liquor 
Regulation took the Kordister 
judgements into consideration, 
but still approved Woolworths’ 
application for a big-box liquor 
store in a suburb that was a 
known hotspot for alcohol-
related domestic violence 
(5:paras 210,242), concluding 
that “overall this application 
would not be conducive to or 
encourage the misuse or abuse of 
alcohol” (5:para 305).
Resource requirements/
implications
The ongoing resource 
requirements relate mainly to 
resource-intensive periodic 
reviews of liquor licensing Acts, 
for example, as seen in the ACT, 
Western Australia, New South 
Wales, Tasmania and South 
Australia in the past few years. 
This does not mean the objects 
of the Acts are changed. In the 
case of the Tasmanian review, 
recommendations include 
having objects in line with other 
jurisdictions, although they 
have not recommended harm 
minimisation is the primary 
object (6:10). The effort required 
to interpret harm minimisation 
in court appears to be another 
resource implication. The 
resource implications associated 
with elevating harm minimisation 
to the primary object are 
nevertheless minimal.
Political support for policy
Having harm minimisation 
enshrined in the objects of liquor 
licensing Acts is commonplace 
in Australia and had been 
introduced in most jurisdictions 
by 2012. It is much less clear 
that harm minimisation has 
been awarded the primary 
object status, where minimising 
harm from alcohol becomes the 
‘fundamental principle’ on which 
the liquor licensing legislation 
rests. And, as the 2016 Victorian 
decision illustrates, having harm 
minimisation as the fundamental 
principle does not mean licensing 
authorities will decide against the 
greater availability of alcohol on 
harm minimisation grounds. 
Policy mechanisms
Liquor licensing legislation lies 
at the heart of having harm 
minimisation as a guiding 
principle. However, as is seen 
from the Tasmanian example, 
it has been possible to have 
a Liquor Act without objects, 
although this is being rectified.
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Many services that respond to 
alcohol-related harm rely on 
local data to plan their activities 
effectively. This includes health 
services, police, and local licensing 
teams, among others. However, 
these different services often 
work independently, which 
limits data sharing and effective 
collaboration. Some areas have 
addressed this problem by more 
effectively sharing data between 
services. This may assist in 
reducing alcohol-related harm by 
facilitating evidence-based policy 
development and better responses 
to local issues. 
In the UK, the ‘Cardiff model’ is seen 
as the leading approach to data 
sharing because of the pioneering 
collaboration and processes 
introduced in the region. Prior 
to its introduction, two-thirds of 
assaults treated in local emergency 
departments went unreported to 
the police.137 The Cardiff model 
established common standards for 
data reporting and encouraged 
the local emergency department 
to make this anonymised data 
available to police and local 
government to help inform 
prevention strategy and tactics.
Based on the experiences in 
Cardiff and other areas that 
have introduced the model, the 
National Health Service (NHS) 
has developed a set of national 
guidelines on how data should 
be collected and shared.138 The 
national guidelines recommend 
that ED receptionists collect data at 
registration. Three critical pieces of 
information include:
 ● date and time of the assault
 ● means of assault (weapon or 
body part used)
 ● assault location.
This anonymised data should 
be shared on a monthly basis 
with the local Community Safety 
Partnershipa (CSP). There is no 
need for a formal information 
sharing agreement, as the data 
is anonymised. The information 
may then be used by police and 
local government to develop a 
more detailed picture of violence 
patterns in the region. This may 
assist the development of a more 
targeted response to issues, and 
support a number of measures 
for reducing crime in specific 
areas. For example, police can 
focus their patrols on high-risk 
areas, conduct overt or covert 
interventions in particular licensed 
premises, or can close risky areas 
to traffic. Local government 
can use the data to inform their 
licensing decisions, both in terms 
of specifically addressing problem 
outlets and controlling the supply 
of alcohol in assault ‘hotspots’. 
The data collected is also an 
invaluable resource for monitoring 
performance and the success of 
specific interventions.
Evidence of impact
A number of evaluations have 
demonstrated that information 
sharing between services can 
be effective at reducing violent 
incidents and crime and therefore, 
reducing pressure on the wider 
LOCATION: England and Wales
WHAT IS IT? A method of collating data relating to alcohol-related violence for use within licensing 
decisions and enforcement activity. 
POLICY SCORE: 6 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: • It has been shown to dramatically reduce rates of alcohol-related violence.
CONS: • It can be difficult to coordinate and implement, particularly in busy urban areas with 
multiple night time economy areas and hospitals.
THE CARDIFF MODEL OF ANONYMOUS DATA SHARING
a  Community safety partnerships are statutory bodies comprised of councilors and independent members of the community who act as a  
    liaison between community and police.
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emergency services. In Cardiff itself, 
implementing the model reduced 
the number of assault patients 
seeking Accident and Emergency 
(A&E) treatment by 35 per cent 
within five years (compared with 
an overall 18 per cent rise in 
England and Wales). Assaults in 
licensed premises in Cardiff fell by 
a third. 
As a result, Cardiff improved its 
ranking for safety provided by the 
Home Office, and by 2005 had the 
fifth lowest level of violence in all 
towns with populations greater 
than 100,000 in England and Wales. 
Within its Home Office ‘family’ of 
fifteen comparable cities (based on 
socioeconomic and demographic 
statistics), Cardiff rose from bottom 
to top by 2006.139 An economic 
cost-benefit analysis estimated 
the intervention reduced the 
economic and social costs of 
violence in Cardiff by £7 million 
in 2007, including £1.62 million 
of savings to the criminal justice 
system, and £1.25m of savings to 
the health service. This represents 
£82 of benefit for every £1 invested 
in the programme.140
This success has lead the Home 
Office to reference the Cardiff 
model in its Modern Crime 
Prevention Strategy and encourage 
its use nationally. However, the 
logistical arrangements required 
to collect and share accurate 
information presents some 
challenges. While all hospitals, 
particularly A&Es, have been 
required to share relevant 
information with the police for 
some time,141 implementation of 
these guidelines has been patchy 
and inconsistent. Compliance by 
A&E Departments has risen from 
36 per cent in 2012 to 61 per cent 
in 2014. Yet of these, 25 per cent 
were only reporting low-quality 
data with limited usefulness. In 
addition, in 2014 more than half 
of all CSPs responding to the 
survey reported not receiving 
violence assault data from any A&E, 
showing there is significant room 
for improvement.142
Resource requirements /
implications
To some extent, the slow national 
implementation of the Cardiff 
model has resulted from a lack of 
investment of resources, as well as 
difficulties in changing entrenched 
work practices within hospitals. 
It is however now mandatory 
for hospitals to collect Cardiff 
model data under the terms of 
the standard NHS contract.143 
The willingness of A&E staff, in 
particular receptionists, is key 
to ensuring a complete uptake 
of the model. This highlights 
the importance of staff training; 
ensuring staff understand the 
usefulness of data being collected. 
Given the financial and time 
pressures within A&E departments, 
gaining support from A&E staff has 
proven difficult at times.
The availability of data analysts, 
to sort and anonymise the data 
before sharing and to later analyse 
it, is a key resource implication. 
Previous research identified one 
instance where a data-sharing 
project collapsed after a key 
analyst was removed from the local 
NHS and not replaced.144
Geographic and structural 
issues are another important 
consideration and may result in 
significant resource implications 
in some regions. The Cardiff 
region was, in many ways, an ideal 
location for such an information-
sharing network to be developed – 
with one key night time economy 
location, served by one hospital, 
and covered by one police force, 
and one local government 
licensing team. Large metropolitan 
areas, such as London, face 
significantly more geographic and 
logistical barriers to successful 
implementation of the Cardiff 
model. In some areas, it has been 
difficult to collate the necessary 
information over such a wide area. 
In parts of London, assault victims 
became spread among a wide 
number of hospitals, who at times 
record information in different 
ways and with varying degrees 
of accuracy. Despite considerable 
effort, overcoming these barriers 
and bringing all the necessary 
partners together has only been 
partially successful.
Political support for policy
The significant improvement in 
public safety brought about by 
the Cardiff model in some areas 
has bought the scheme a strong 
degree of political support, both 
within government and among 
local police forces and councils. 
Policy mechanisms
In the UK, the spread of the Cardiff 
model was aided by changes to 
the NHS contract, which made 
relevant data sharing with the 
police mandatory and encouraged 
better joint working. This has 
supported the introduction of the 
scheme by prioritising its adoption 
through government contracts. 
However, the development of local 
frameworks and ways of working 
which overcome local barriers to 
data sharing remains important.
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The principle of harm 
minimisation in Australia and 
the public health objective 
in Scottish licensing both 
highlight the differences 
between legislative theory 
and licensing practice; having 
these issues firmly within 
licensing law does not mean 
that they have the impact that 
might be initially assumed, 
due to other legal issues 
within the legislation. Both of 
these cases point towards the 
type of evidence needed and 
the burden of proof used as 
important factors, as well as the 
influence of the licensed trade.
The burden of proof
As demonstrated in Western 
Australia, the way in which 
the burden of proof operates 
has significant implications. 
Requiring licence applications 
in Western Australia to 
demonstrate they are in 
the public interest provides 
licensing authorities with 
greater ability to reject 
unsuitable applications. The 
operation of CIPs in England 
and Wales and the principle of 
overprovision in Scotland seem 
to provide similar outcomes. 
While neither CIPs nor 
overprovisions necessarily stop 
new licences being granted, 
the reversal of the burden of 
proof provides councils with 
greater discretion regarding 
which licences they approve 
and the conditions under 
which they operate, assuming 
a representation is received 
against the application.
Across England, Wales, 
and Scotland many local 
government use their 
Statement of Licensing Policies 
(SLPs) in a similar manner. By 
outlining and evidencing local 
problems and concerns, they 
attempt to place a greater 
onus on the applicant to prove 
they will not add to these. 
This appears to be relatively 
successful, although such 
policies may be constrained by 
the licensing regime. Under the 
Licensing Act (2003), paragraph 
8.33 of the s 182 Guidance 
also instructs applicants to 
“undertake their own enquiries 
about the area in which the 
premises are situated to inform 
the content of the application” 
and to detail how they will 
address local risks.
Regardless of the existence of 
a health or harm minimisation 
approach, requiring the applicant 
to prove their application is in 
the public interest and would not 
add to existing problems seems 
likely to increase the discretion of 
the licensing authority to reject 
licences it views as unsuitable. 
However, the reverse is also 
true – it is more difficult for 
licensing authorities to prove that 
individual premises are likely to 
cause or add to problems. This 
makes the decision about the 
way in which the burden of proof 
operates within licensing law 
a fundamentally political one. 
Does the legislation inherently 
support the licensing authority, 
which should be operating in 
the wider public interest? Or, 
does it support a business first 
approach?
The debate about this issue is 
not new. The predecessor to the 
Licensing Act (2003) in England 
and Wales gave magistrates 
discretion as to whether there 
was a ‘need’ for new licensed 
premises in an area, and 
previous Australian legislation 
took ‘community need’ into 
account. The current Western 
Australian need for applications 
to be proved in the public 
interest is not quite the same, 
as decisions cannot be arbitrary, 
but the reversal of the burden 
of proof arguably works in a 
very similar way.
This makes Western Australia 
an interesting counter-example 
to a more free market driven 
approach, where the emphasis 
is on the local government to 
prove a licence would cause 
a problem has constrained 
councils and communities and 
significantly helped the licensed 
trade. In many jurisdictions, 
such as the UK, a return to ‘need’ 
would be extremely unlikely. 
However, requiring applicants 
to demonstrate that their venue 
would be in the public good is 
a feasible change, due in large 
part to its successful application 
in regions such as Western 
Australia and similarities to CIPs.
Dealing with evidence
In addition to the way in which 
this burden of proof operates, 
issues around the interpretation 
of the harm minimisation 
concept are also highlighted 
in the risk-based licensing case 
study. This reflects many of 
the key obstacles identified 
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by those trying to implement 
the public health objective in 
Scotland, with disagreements 
about what constitutes 
appropriate evidence and the 
scope of health-related issues 
that may be addressed through 
licensing. 
As reflected in the case study, 
the Victorian Court of Appeal 
(VCA) outlined three categories 
of evidence (general, local, 
and specific evidence). The 
VCA also sought to identify 
circumstances requiring 
a causal link between the 
problem and the premises. 
This approach to evidence is 
effective in allowing both those 
with a focus on shorter-term 
problems and longer-term harm 
to present evidence within the 
framework. As such, adoption 
of a similar approach may be 
beneficial in the UK as a way of 
clarifying things.
Evidence and causality
For a British audience, the 
way the VCA outlined when 
causality should or should not 
be required is of great interest. 
The same approach is facilitated 
by legislation in both the 
Licensing Act (2003) in England 
and Wales, and the Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2005. Both these 
regimes operate with a ‘balance 
of probabilities’, which means 
decisions can be made on the 
grounds that something is more 
likely than not to be the case. 
It is, therefore, necessary to 
evidence and judge that there is 
a relationship between premises 
and a problem, but not the need 
to definitively prove a link, 145 
which is very similar to ‘locality 
evidence’ in Victoria.
The Court of Appeal in London 
has described this as involving 
‘an evaluative judgment’. The 
situation is similar to that found 
in Scotland. For example, an 
appeal against a licence refused 
on the grounds of overprovision 
stated, “the pursuer demands a 
standard appropriate to a court 
not a licensing board. Unlike a 
court judgment, it is sufficient 
for a board to make a value 
judgement”.146
The fact that many local 
governments across the UK 
do not take this approach, 
choosing instead to apply 
definitive causality in a way 
similar to a court of law, 
can at times be a result of 
their reluctance to make 
controversial decisions. 
This reduces governments’ 
discretion to use licensing 
systems in the public interest 
and affects all issues related to 
licensed premises. However, 
some authorities do carefully 
train their licensing committees 
to make decisions on the 
balance of probabilities and 
find it very effective.147
The fact that the Kordister case 
in Victoria is something of a 
landmark, but it is not clear that 
it offers a concrete precedent 
for future cases, represents 
another parallel between these 
different licensing systems. 
In theory, there exists a way for 
these systems to be used and 
interpreted that would make 
it easier for local government 
to use a wider and potentially 
more effective range of 
evidence and to make decisions 
on the balance of probabilities. 
Yet in practice this often does 
not happen, frequently to the 
detriment of local communities. 
For those with an interest 
in reducing alcohol-related 
harm, improving the day-to-
day application of licensing 
at a local level should be as 
important a concern as efforts 
to improve licensing regulations 
themselves.
Evidence and locality
Another interesting parallel is 
the way in which the Victorian 
Court of Appeal stressed 
the importance of ‘locality 
evidence’, which is by definition 
linked to the “particular 
local, social, demographic or 
geographical circumstances of 
the relevant premises”. There is 
a very common misconception 
under the Licensing Act (2003) 
that a licensed venue cannot 
be considered within the wider 
location in which it sits (the 
so-called ‘premises by premises’ 
approach). Yet, there is nothing 
in the Act, Guidance, or case 
law to directly support this.148 
In fact, the Court of Appeal in 
London has made comments 
remarkably similar to the 
Court of Appeal in Victoria. In 
the Hope and Glory case, for 
example, it talks at length about 
licensing being “an evaluation 
of what is to be regarded as 
reasonably acceptable in the 
particular location… [this] is 
essentially a matter of judgment 
rather than a matter of pure 
fact” (Hope and Glory, 2011, para 
42).
Addressing misconceptions 
may allow both the Licensing 
Act (2003) and the Licensing 
Act (Scotland) 2005 to be used 
in a far more holistic manner, 
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better taking into account 
how licensed venues interact 
with their locality. It would 
allow consideration of the 
wider evidence, which may not 
have a direct causal link to the 
premises, as highlighted by the 
VCA. As a result, a wider range 
of health and social impacts can 
be considered, although clearly, 
this is easier with the Licensing 
Act (Scotland) 2005 because of 
its specific health objective. 
Across both jurisdictions, the 
key obstacle appears to be 
financial pressures and local 
governments’ concerns about 
expensive legal action from the 
licensed trade.
Local governments have 
demonstrated a willingness 
to engage in legal action to 
uphold local interest, but this, 
of course, is no guarantee of 
success. In Australia, despite the 
precedent set for recognising 
harm minimisation as the 
primary object of the Liquor 
Control Reform Act (1998) by 
the Kordister149 case, elements 
of the ruling left interpretation 
open to arguments favouring 
industry interests on the 
basis of perceived community 
expectations. For example, in 
the Victorian City of Casey, city 
planners were unsuccessful 
in their objection to the 
development of a big-box 
packaged liquor outlet. The 
council was concerned about 
the impact of the large new 
establishment in a region 
already affected by high levels 
of domestic violence and 
other alcohol-related harm. 
The Victorian Commission 
for Gambling and Liquor 
Regulation (VCGLR) ruled 
against the council, citing 
components of the Kordister 
case ruling, including that a 
decision must seek to “balance 
each of the objects and arrive at 
an appropriate synthesis in the 
particular circumstances of the 
case by way of a discretionary 
judgement”.150 The decision 
also cited a need to strike “an 
appropriate balance between 
the need to minimise harm 
arising from the misuse and 
abuse of alcohol and the 
interests in developing a 
diversity of licensed facilities 
reflecting the community 
expectations”.151
In this way, the primacy of 
harm minimisation has been 
undermined by legal precedent 
promoting the need to provide 
licensed facilities in accordance 
with community expectations. 
Surprisingly, opposition by the 
City of Casey and local police to 
the big-box liquor development 
appears to have not been 
considered representative of 
community expectations in 
the VCGLR ruling in favour of 
another off-premise alcohol 
outlet.
Data and the Cardiff model
So far this discussion has dealt 
with the general approach 
of licensing regimes to the 
harm caused by alcohol 
(harm minimisation and 
public health), as well as the 
more detailed workings of 
the decision-making process. 
Against this, the Cardiff 
model case study provides a 
framework for how information 
can be collected and shared to 
facilitate effective strategies 
to reduce harm. The accurate 
collection of data may help to 
improve licensing decisions 
by better demonstrating the 
impact of alcohol-related harm 
in local regions. In many ways, 
the results from Cardiff speak 
for themselves, with improved 
data leading to better police 
and enforcement work, which 
corresponded with a 35 per 
cent reduction in A&E assault 
patients within five years. 
However, it is clear that the 
Cardiff model is not necessarily 
easy to implement, particularly 
in highly urbanised areas 
with multiple night-time 
economy hotspots and 
more than one hospital or 
emergency department. Issues 
relating to the accuracy and 
timeliness of data are not only 
found in the UK but in many 
areas of Australia as well. 
The inconsistent collection 
and publication of data on 
alcohol-related harm across 
Australian jurisdictions presents 
limitations with respect 
to evidence-based policy 
formulation and evaluation. 
This includes data relating 
to both crime and health 
services. The Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research in 
NSW, for example, provides 
access to comprehensive stores 
of crime data and analysis. 
However, other jurisdictions 
either restrict access or charge 
fees to complete specific data 
requests. Similarly, while some 
health data are published in a 
nationally-consistent manner, 
inconsistencies limit the 
capacity of both researchers 
and government for efficient 
and robust analysis. Harm 
minimisation and health issues 
would be more effectively 
supported by improved 
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access to comprehensive and 
consistent data on alcohol-
related harm.
While the Cardiff model for data 
collection is not currently in 
use in Australia, the National 
Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC) recently 
awarded a grant for a five-year 
trial across eight emergency 
departments in Victoria, NSW, 
and the ACT.152 Consistent 
with the Cardiff model, the 
trial will mandate collection 
of information relating to the 
location of victims’ last drinks 
as part of hospital triage 
services and follow-ups. The 
trial is likely to improve service 
planning and delivery, as well 
as regulatory measures aimed 
to reduce alcohol-related harm 
in the most affected areas. To 
receive the full benefit of such 
collection practices, a nationally 
consistent Cardiff model 
approach should be adopted.
The importance of empowering 
communities with information 
to evaluate the risk of 
new alcohol outlets to the 
community, and oppose these 
at the application stage where 
appropriate, was highlighted 
in a recent case involving a 
residents’ group in the Sydney 
(NSW) suburb of Casula. The 
Casula Community Group 
for Responsible Planning 
(CCGRP) were able to join the 
local council in opposing a 
development application in 
the NSW Land & Environment 
Court (LEC) on the basis that 
they were able to bring new 
evidence to the case.153 The 
LEC’s decision considered 
the nature and extent of 
independent evidence related 
to alcohol harm prevention 
presented by the CCGRP were 
sufficiently distinct from that of 
the council’s.154 In this way, the 
ability of community members 
to deliver an informed and 
new perspective on the matter 
is crucial where the council 
does not adequately represent 
their interests. This must be 
underpinned by appropriate 
data, which demonstrates the 
need to collect and publish 
these in a comprehensive and 
consistent manner.
Summary
These three issues show how 
licensing in the UK and Australia 
share similar concerns, with 
many similar physical and social 
risks as well as obstacles. The 
need for clear and reliable data 
is crucial to overcoming such 
limitations, but so too is better 
understanding the conflict 
between focusing on specific 
local issues and problems across 
regions more broadly.
All of the licensing regimes 
discussed here do allow for a 
wider area focus, even if this 
does not always happen in 
practice. With this wider focus 
comes a wider view of the 
acceptable evidence, which 
does not always have to be 
strictly causal. This aids the 
harm minimisation and health 
impact approach, although 
it is interesting that the way 
in which the burden of proof 
operates is just as, if not more, 
significant. These details can at 
times be lost in the contested 
legal process and overcoming 
this is perhaps the biggest 
hurdle of all.
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CONCLUSIONS
Lessons for the UK:
It is important that the Cardiff model is rolled out further across the UK. Lessons may also be learnt from the 
way levels of evidence are recognised under the framework provided by the Victorian Court of Appeal in 
Australia. This clarification would assist in identifying appropriate evidence for use in licensing decisions. An 
additional licensing objective to promote health and wellbeing would facilitate the use of such evidence to 
ensure the availability of alcohol does not unduly undermine society and lead to health and social hazards. 
While evidence from Scotland suggests a public health objective can be made to work, a ‘harm minimisation’ 
objective could provide an an alternative or complementary approach.
Placing the onus on applicants to prove that their venue would be in the public interest, and not add to 
existing local harm, appears to have benefits for protecting the interest of local communities. Adoption of 
this approach should be considered within the Licensing Act (2003) and the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005.
This objective would clarify that locally based impacts on health and wellbeing are a consideration in licensing. 
With this objective, licensing decisions over time would be more likely to create an environment in which 
alcohol does not unduly undermine society and lead to health and social hazards. The key legal principles 
within the Act would limit this objective in exactly the same way as they do for the other objectives, meaning 
that health and wellbeing impacts more proximal to licensed venues are more likely to fall within its remit
Lessons for Australia:
While trials of the Cardiff model are underway in Australia, expansion of its use would be beneficial. As with 
the UK, reversing the burden of proof within licensing decisions (as found in Western Australia) may better 
ensure that public health is prioritised in licensing decisions.
Similarly, more widespread adoption of licensing objectives that prioritise public health and harm 
minimisation would allow government better control over outlet density and more adequate levels of 
protection for communities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Place the onus on applicants to prove that their venue is in the public interest
Reverse the burden of proof in licensing decisions to require applicants to demonstrate that granting of a 
license is in the public interest. 
7. Include and prioritise public health and/or harm minimisation objectives in liquor legislation
Specify in all liquor legislation public health and the minimisation of harm as objectives in the regulation 
of alcohol, including licensing decisions, and ensure they have primacy over other objectives, to empower 
communities and allow governments greater control of outlet density.
8. Enhance data sharing to facilitate more targeted policy interventions 
Collect and share data from hospital emergency departments and police, in a manner consistent with the 
‘Cardiff model’, to inform policy development and improve strategies to reduce alcohol harm.
PRODUCT
RESTRICTION
POLICIES
COMPARING AND DISCUSSING:
RESTRICTIONS ON PURCHASE OF CERTAIN PRODUCTS
REDUCING THE STRENGTH SCHEMES
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There are two major approaches 
to restricting the purchase of 
certain alcohol products. Firstly, 
those that limit the sale or 
purchase of products designed 
to be consumed rapidly or to 
facilitate intoxication after a 
certain time. Secondly, those 
that target mainly packaged 
liquor sales in remote 
communities with a high degree 
of alcohol harm in Indigenous 
communities. While there are 
clear distinctions between the 
motivations for each, these 
approaches share the common 
feature of seeking to restrict the 
sale of particular products that 
contribute disproportionately 
to the level of alcohol harm. 
The harm that stems from 
binge drinking in nightclub 
districts may be addressed by 
restricting the sale of alcohol 
products conducive to rapid 
intoxication. Similarly, the 
burden of alcohol in remote 
Indigenous communities may 
be addressed by identifying and 
regulating the sale of products 
seen to contribute most to such 
problems.
In NSW, restrictions were 
applied to pubs trading in the 
CBD of the city of Newcastle in 
2008, including a restriction on 
the sale of shots after 10pm. 
Since 24 February 2014, there 
have also been restrictions 
on certain drinks in the 
Kings Cross and Sydney CBD 
Entertainment Precincts in the 
general late trading period 
from midnight until ceasing 
of trading or 7am, as outlined 
in the Liquor Regulation 2008 
(NSW). In Queensland, the 
Tackling Alcohol-Fuelled Violence 
Legislation Amendment Act 
2016 banned the sale or supply 
of rapid intoxication drinks 
between midnight and 5am. 
Rapid intoxication drinks are 
those that facilitate or encourage 
rapid intoxication as they are 
designed to be consumed 
rapidly or contain a high 
percentage of alcohol. In NSW 
legislation, this is called a shot. 
However, NSW also identifies 
drinks containing spirits or 
liqueur with more than 50 per 
cent alcohol, more than 30 ml 
of spirits or liqueur, or ready-to-
drink spirits in its definition of 
rapid intoxication drinks. NSW 
also restricts the quantity of 
liquor sold or supplied to one 
person, both in the general late 
trading period and after 2am in 
specified precincts. Queensland 
identifies various conditions 
by which premises can apply 
for an exemption from this 
requirement. These conditions 
include venue size and the way 
in which liquor is served.
Policies that limit the sale or 
supply of particular products 
to certain days and times, and 
in certain restricted quantities 
or container size, are popular in 
remote Australian communities 
with large Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander populations. There 
are many different location-
specific restrictions. This report 
presents only a few such examples, 
rather than a complete list of all 
restrictions. For example, in the 
Kimberley region of Western 
Australia, there have been limits 
on the size of packaged liquor 
containers for sale since 2009. In 
Kununurra in Western Australia, 
RESTRICTIONS ON PURCHASE OF CERTAIN PRODUCTS
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT? Restriction on the sale of particular alcohol products.
POLICY SCORE: 6 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: 
• Some evidence for effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related harm in indigenous 
communities.
• May be targeted toward products identified as causing a disproportionate level of harm.
CONS: • Evidence suggests that restricted products are substituted for alternatives.
• May be considered discriminatory when applied to individual regions.
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limits have been in place since 
2015 on the sale of packaged 
liquor per person per day relating 
to the strength of alcohol and 
restrictions between 12pm to 8pm, 
Monday to Saturday. In Katherine 
in the Northern Territory, there 
have been restrictions on the times 
packaged liquor can be purchased, 
on the size of the container and 
times of purchase for cask wine 
and fortified wine, and the strength 
of beer that can be consumed on 
licensed premises before midday.
Implementation of the restrictions 
for takeaway alcohol has resulted 
in a trial of a Takeaway Alcohol 
Management System (TAMS) in the 
Shire of Wyndham East Kimberley 
in Western Australia. TAMS is a 
simple scanning technology system 
that implements a daily alcohol 
purchase limit. The scanners use 
legal personal identification to 
allow licensees to register how 
much an individual has purchased 
on any one particular day, across 
all takeaway liquor outlets. The 
12-month TAMS trial commenced 
within the Shire of Wyndham East 
Kimberley on 14 December 2015. 
A formal evaluation of the system 
will be conducted as part of the 
Wyndham trial.155
Evidence of impact
The difficulty assessing the impact 
of restrictions on the purchase of 
products such as shots is that in the 
cases available for study it is only 
one of a range of policy measures 
introduced simultaneously. For 
example, as noted above, in 
2008 a range of restrictions were 
introduced on pubs trading in 
the CBD of the city of Newcastle. 
This included a restriction on 
the sale of shots after 10pm, 
the introduction of dedicated 
responsible service officers within 
venues, and mandated closing 
at 3:30am with a lockout from 
1:30am (initially 3am and 1am 
respectively). The study found a 
37 per cent reduction in assaults 
between 10pm and 6am.156 Follow-
up research demonstrated these 
reductions had been sustained 
over the five years following the 
intervention. 157 The authors also 
showed that the majority of this 
reduction came after 3am with little 
impact evident between 1am and 
3am. This suggests the trading hour 
restrictions, not the lockout or other 
measures such as restriction on the 
sale of shots, were the key policy. 
A number of evaluations have 
found restrictions on alcohol’s 
availability in Indigenous 
communities are associated with 
sustained impacts on violence and 
health. 158 An evaluation of one 
restriction prohibiting the sale of 
takeaway liquor with more than 
2.7 per cent alcohol in Halls Creek 
found a substantial reduction in a 
range of police and hospitalisation 
indicators. Similarly, two studies on 
Alcohol Management Plans (AMPs) 
in four communities in Cape 
York (predominantly restricting 
takeaway sales of stronger beer 
and spirits) found a reduction in 
serious injury.159,160 At the same 
time, results from evaluations of 
AMPS in Queensland have been 
more mixed.161,162 Evaluations 
have also been conducted for 
AMPs on Groote Eylandt and 
Bickerton Island that required all 
residents to use a permit in order 
to purchase takeaway alcohol.163 
While finding positive effects on 
violence and community harmony, 
it is not possible to translate policy 
implications to the mainland 
and non-geographically isolated 
communities. In Alice Springs, 
a 14-month trial ban on four 
and five-litre casks of wine, in 
combination with reductions in 
off-premise trading hours, resulted 
in a reduction in harm and a shift 
in purchasing to the next cheapest 
form of alcohol.164  Commentators 
have noted policies relying on 
police enforcement and punitive 
measures often target Indigenous 
Australians and that interventions 
require the support of the local 
community to be effective.165
Resource requirements/
implications
Overall, the administrative burden 
associated with product restriction 
is relatively small. Costs are 
predominantly associated with 
compliance inspectors to monitor 
licensed premises to ensure 
licensees are compliant with their 
liquor licence conditions. At the 
same time, savings that may result 
from harm reduction are likely to 
go some way toward balancing 
these additional costs.
Political support for policy
In its 2016 annual alcohol poll, 
FARE identified that just over 
half the population (58 per 
cent of Australians) support 
stopping the sale of shots after 
10pm. However, this was the 
least supported alcohol policy 
measure of 11 canvassed with, for 
example, increasing the penalties 
for people involved in alcohol-
related violence attracting 86 per 
cent support.166 Furthermore, 76 
per cent of adults aged over 50 
and 58 per cent of adults aged 
35-49 supported stopping the 
sale of shots, compared to 43 per 
cent of adults aged 23-35 and 50 
per cent of those between the 
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age of 18 and 24. Stopping the 
sale of alcohol and energy drinks 
after midnight was supported by 
61 per cent overall, and placing 
a limit of four on the number of 
drinks a person can purchase 
at one time after 10pm was 
supported by 65 per cent overall.
Policy mechanisms
Policy mechanisms for the 
restriction of particular products 
have been through legislation, 
covered either in jurisdictional 
Liquor Acts or in regulation. In 
some cases, the power of the 
licensing authority to impose 
conditions at its discretion is 
provided within the legislation. 
This is the case in Western 
Australia, for example.
REDUCING THE STRENGTH SCHEMES
LOCATION: England and Wales
WHAT IS IT? Local governments coordinating voluntary action among the off-trade to remove 
products known to be favoured by the street drinking community. 
POLICY SCORE: 5 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: • Has been found to work well to reduce local alcohol-related problems.
• Can generate opportunities to engage with and help the street drinking community.
CONS: 
• Is relatively resource intensive.
• The voluntary nature of the scheme creates difficulties, prompting resistance from 
licensing authorities and undermining effectiveness.
Reducing the strength (RTS) 
schemes, also known as super 
strength schemes, involve 
encouraging newsagents, 
off-licences, and sometimes 
supermarkets, not to sell certain 
high strength beer, lager, and cider. 
Restrictions are typically applied to 
beverages with 6.5 per cent alcohol 
or more. Because these products 
tend to be favoured by street 
drinkers, RTS schemes aim to reduce 
street drinking and associated 
problems by addressing their 
physical and economic availability. 
There are around 100 of these 
schemes estimated to be in the UK 
at present. 
To meet obligations under 
competition law in the UK, 
these schemes must be entirely 
voluntary. Regulating bodies are 
not permitted to coerce retailers 
to withdraw particular items from 
sale. While this can greatly limit their 
application, the Local Government 
Association (LGA) has produced 
guidance on how to implement 
this type of scheme legally.167 
Although parts of the licensed 
trade have questioned the legality 
of even voluntary schemes, the 
Competition and Markets Authority 
has stated that RTS schemes are 
not a priority and that it would only 
consider enforcement action where 
it suspected retailers were using the 
schemes as ‘cover for price-fixing’.168
As with other licensing 
interventions, RTS schemes 
should be based on evidence and 
a clear understanding of local 
problems and their likely impacts. 
This should include consideration 
of the street drinking community, 
their preferred products and 
places of purchase, where they 
are likely to congregate and 
sleep, and any violent incidents 
or other associated problems. 
This information can be used to 
define the specific geographic 
region covered, as well as the 
specific products most likely to 
be associated with problems. 
It is also important to engage 
with services working alongside 
the homeless community, so 
that RTS schemes can be used 
to offer help to this vulnerable 
group rather than moving street 
drinking and its associated 
problems to another area. 
In some areas, local businesses 
appear to have been reluctant to 
participate. In other areas, especially 
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those where problems with street 
drinking have been particularly 
prominent, businesses have been 
more supportive of RTS schemes. 
Retailers have reported feeling 
intimidated when refusing alcohol 
sales to people who are intoxicated, 
which may be reduced under RTS 
schemes if beverages favoured 
by street drinkers are not stocked. 
Additional policing support to 
help retailers refuse such sales can 
also play a role to reduce incidents 
involving street drinkers.169
Evidence of impact
The original RTS scheme launched 
in Ipswich in September 2012, with 
two-thirds of the town’s 147 off-
licensed stores involved. In the year 
following its introduction, reports 
of street drinking dropped by 23 
per cent across Ipswich. One region, 
where street drinking had caused 
substantial problems previously, 
observed a 73 per cent reduction in 
reports of street drinking to police 
in the year following the scheme’s 
introduction, and a 31 per cent 
reduction in crime. 170 A similar 
scheme in the city of Portsmouth 
achieved an 80 per cent reduction 
in street drinking in some parts of 
the city after 12 months.171
Resource requirements/
implications
RTS schemes are relatively resource 
intensive. To be most effective, 
they require collaboration across 
licensing teams, the police, alcohol 
treatment and outreach services, as 
well as the local licensed trade. 
Political support for policy
The political feasibility of RTS 
schemes is increasing, with a larger 
number of local schemes providing 
evidence of their effectiveness. The 
strongest opposition appears to 
come from the licensed trade. There 
have been reports of hectoring 
and inaccurate legal letters sent to 
local governments as an attempt to 
prevent the introduction of these 
schemes. 
Policy mechanisms
RTS schemes exist without any 
policy or statutory footing. Detailed 
guidance is provided by the 
LGA, which provides important 
information to ensure that 
participating businesses do not 
encounter problems associated 
with competition law. 
In theory, local government 
may introduce mandatory bans 
on certain products if harm 
could be specifically attributed 
to them. Competition law may 
not apply where public health 
concerns are present if measures 
are proportionate and there is 
appropriate evidence to justify 
their use. However, this remains 
challenging as it would likely 
involve a lengthy legal challenge 
from the licensed trade. 
DISCUSSION OF PRODUCT RESTRICTION POLICIES
Restrictions on certain products 
Policies that restrict the sale of 
certain alcohol products have 
been introduced in Australia and 
the UK to address a broad range of 
alcohol-related harms. In Australia, 
product restrictions have been 
used to address alcohol-related 
harm in remote Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities. 
Such policies have predominantly 
been used in the Northern 
Territory, including in the town 
centres and surrounding regions 
of Tennant Creek, Elliot, Curtain 
Springs and Katherine.172 While 
similar in nature, the RTS scheme 
in the UK has sought to reduce 
the availability of certain 
products in more urban settings, 
and these are not widespread 
across the country. Although 
both approaches seek to address 
public/street drinking, the 
associated burden of disease and 
criminal activity, they differ in 
several fundamental ways.
In the UK, RTS involves voluntary 
agreements between local 
councils and liquor retailers to 
tackle alcohol problems. Due to 
competition law, liquor retailers 
cannot be forced to enter into 
such agreements, which reduces 
the licensing authorities’ ability to 
introduce measures that reduce 
the harm caused by alcohol. In 
contrast to the voluntary RTS, 
licensing authorities have typically 
mandated product restrictions in 
Australia. For example, in its power 
under the Liquor Act 1978 (NT), 
the Northern Territory Licensing 
Commission has imposed 
restrictions on particular licence 
types in various locations where 
alcohol misuse become a serious 
concern to the community.173 
Such mandatory restrictions 
are important in addressing 
externalities, where businesses 
have a conflict of interest between 
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potential profits and the harm 
inflicted on individuals and 
communities.
The voluntary nature of RTS 
schemes presents challenges. For 
example, RTS in Ipswich (UK) saw 
approximately two-thirds of the 
147 off-licence stores sign up to 
the agreement. The remaining 
third are likely to have benefited 
financially from the policy, by 
encouraging people seeking to 
purchase restricted products to 
their store. One study identified 
concern among participants in 
the scheme that patrons shopping 
elsewhere might impact their 
businesses financially.174
However, business owners may 
be motivated to continue their 
participation for several other 
reasons. The study identified that 
in addition to alcohol-related harm 
reduction, retailers participated 
in RTS to deter disruptive 
customers from the store, reduce 
neighbourhood disruption, and to 
maintain a good relationship with 
the local government.175
Participants in the UK RTS also 
reported concerns the scheme’s 
effectiveness would be reduced 
due to customers circumventing 
the measure by shopping at non-
participating stores, and that a 
large-scale compulsory approach 
would be more effective. Such a 
mandatory approach has been 
used in Australia to restrict the 
sale of cask wine in some remote 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities for example.176,177 
While the benefits of mandatory 
product restriction policies have not 
been assessed specifically, research 
has demonstrated the superiority 
of mandatory temporal restriction 
policies relative to voluntary 
schemes. Similar benefits are likely 
to translate to off-premise alcohol 
sales restrictions, with mandatory 
schemes delivering greater harm 
reduction and outcomes that are 
more equitable by preventing 
businesses from benefiting from the 
responsible practice of others.
Although RTS aims to restrict 
the sale of low price and high 
strength alcohol products,178 
Australian policies have typically 
sought to restrict the sale of 
particular products perceived 
as being more susceptible to 
abuse for a variety of reasons. 
Restrictions appear to be directed 
at products deemed susceptible to 
abuse through a combination of 
alcohol concentration, price, and 
consumption trends. For example, 
restrictions introduced to Tennant 
Creek (NT) in 1995 banned the sale 
of four and five-litre casks of wine 
(among a raft of other measures). 
Restrictions were also placed 
on quantity, such as limitation 
of a single two-litre cask of wine 
purchase per person per day.
By targeting these products, the 
Tennant Creek measures (and other 
similar initiatives) may be better 
placed to address the availability 
of alcohol products favoured by 
problem drinkers. However, they 
have been manifestly inadequate 
in many circumstances. A limit of 
two litres of cask wine per day still 
allows the sale of alcohol well in 
excess of the recommended intake 
under guidelines, such as those 
provided by Australia’s National 
Health and Medical Research 
Council179 and the UK Chief Medical 
Officers.180 Additionally, restricted 
products might be substituted with 
alternatives or circumvented by 
purchasing alcohol in surrounding 
regions.181 Price mechanisms, which 
would be particularly effective 
in reducing the consumption of 
products prone to abuse (such 
as cheap cask wine)182 are more 
likely to be effective in regions 
with high rates of alcohol-related 
harm. In particular, price changes 
would have the greatest effect 
among lower socioeconomic 
demographics,183 which are highly 
represented in the regions where 
product restrictions have been 
introduced.
In addition to product restrictions 
by region, some jurisdictions within 
Australia have also restricted the 
late night trade of high alcohol 
content and rapid consumption 
drinks (such as shots).184,185 In each 
instance, these measures have 
formed part of a raft of measures 
designed to address harm associated 
with late night alcohol trade, 
particularly violence and personal 
injury. While the reduced availability 
of such drinks is likely to limit alcohol 
harm, the effectiveness of these 
measures has not yet been assessed 
and is limited by their introduction 
with a range of other initiatives.
Restriction of particular products 
in late night trade has received 
considerable opposition due to 
the onus placed on businesses 
to understand and abide by rules 
regarding the sale of different 
alcohol products throughout the 
night.186 Consistency in the rules 
applied to the sale of products (for 
instance, determined on the basis 
of strength like those applied under 
RTS) is likely to be an important 
component in reducing regulatory 
burden and subsequent opposition.
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CONCLUSIONS
Lessons for the UK:
The ability of Australian licensing authorities to introduce mandatory bans on certain products is in clear 
contrast to the situation in the UK, where similar efforts to reduce alcohol-related harm among particularly 
affected subgroups are hampered by the voluntary nature of schemes. The effectiveness of schemes such 
as RTS is also undermined by their voluntary nature and the disincentive for businesses to participate that 
results from the non-participation of others. For this reason, mandatory restrictions in high-risk areas are 
likely to provide greater harm reduction. Evidence suggests pricing interventions, such as minimum unit 
pricing, would be more effective at reducing harm associated with cheap alcohol among high-risk groups. 
Lessons for Australia:
While parts of Australia have the advantage of mandatory action, most attempts to address high-risk 
groups have focused on very rural communities. As found in the UK, there may be opportunities to look at 
other issues within urban areas. In general, the harm reduction achieved through restrictions on the sale 
of particular alcohol products is undermined by the availability of alternative products. This substitution 
is reflected in increased sales of alternative products following the introduction of the restriction policy. 
Potentially, a scheme that restricts products on the basis of their concentration or price per unit of alcohol 
may reduce the extent to which restricted products are substituted for alternatives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
9. Restrict the sale of high risk products in areas of concern
Restrict the sale of products susceptible to abuse, on the basis of strength and price, in areas with high levels of 
alcohol harm.
ALCOHOL
INDUSTRY
VOLUNTARY
SCHEMES
COMPARING AND DISCUSSING:
ALCOHOL INDUSTRY VOLUNTARY SCHEMES
LIQUOR ACCORDS
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ALCOHOL INDUSTRY VOLUNTARY SCHEMES
Voluntary best-practice schemes 
within the licensed trade have 
existed since 2003, with a wide 
range now in use. They typically aim 
to increase patronage to licensed 
premises, raise standards and 
compliance with the law. Schemes 
also aim to increase cooperation 
between the licensed trade and 
local regulators, such as the police 
and licensing officials. Award 
ceremonies are often a key feature, 
with the prospect of an award 
often used to motivate venues to 
participate.
Voluntary, business-led initiatives 
include:
 ● The Best Bar None (BBN) 
scheme is sponsored by drinks 
producer Diageo and focuses 
on “promoting responsible 
management and operation of 
alcohol licensed premises”.
 ● Purple Flag is run by the 
Association of Town Centre 
Managers, which states the 
scheme is for “town centres that 
meet or surpass the standards 
of excellence in managing 
the evening and night-time 
economy”.
 ● Community Alcohol Partnerships 
are run by the Retail of Alcohol 
Standards Group, primarily a 
collection of supermarkets and 
convenience store chains, and 
aim to address underage alcohol 
use.
 ● Business Improvement Districts 
(BIDs) differ slightly in that 
they mostly focus on daytime 
activities in town centres. 
However, some areas have 
introduced a specific night 
element, using them in a similar 
manner to the LNL but without 
official input from the local 
government or the police.
Some of these initiatives are 
resourced by both government and 
industry. For example, BBN receives 
backing from the Home Office, 
which has encouraged its expansion 
in areas covered by its Tackling 
Violent Crime Programme. BBN also 
features within the Home Office’s 
Local Alcohol Action Areas (LAAAs) 
and “effective local partnerships” is a 
core element of the alcohol chapter 
in the Home Office’s new Modern 
Crime Prevention Strategy. As part 
of the Public Health Responsibility 
Deal, Bacardi, Diageo, Heineken, 
and Molson Coors have been 
working with the British Institute of 
Innkeeping and the Home Office 
to further develop the Best Bar 
None scheme.187 This has included 
a combined investment of at least 
£500,000 over three years.188
Evidence of impact
Industry claims relating to the 
effectiveness of alcohol industry 
voluntary schemes (voluntary 
schemes) are not supported 
by robust evidence. Literature 
produced by the Portman Group, 
which is funded by the drinks 
industry and widely regarded as 
an industry lobbyist,189 makes 
quite striking claims about the 
effectiveness of voluntary schemes. 
It states, for example, that “since 
Doncaster introduced the [BBN] 
scheme in 2006, violent crime has 
fallen in the town centre during 
the evening by over 40 per cent. 
LOCATION: England, Wales, and Scotland
WHAT IS IT? Industry-run initiative aiming to raise standards and improve business reputation.
POLICY SCORE: 4 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: • They do appear to have had a positive impact in some areas.
CONS: 
• Their impact is difficult to identify.
• There is an inherent conflict of interest in business self-regulating, which means 
business objectives are likely to be prioritised over the public interest.
• Many schemes are relatively resource intensive for the police and local government. 
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Durham has also implemented the 
BBN scheme and has seen crimes of 
violence go down by nearly 60 per 
cent”.190 Supporting publications 
also contain strong quotes of 
support from key politicians and 
police officers. However, there is 
limited evidence these voluntary 
schemes were the key factor in 
producing the positive outcomes, 
particularly in light of significant 
national reductions in crime. A 
document produced by Leeds 
Metropolitan University for Best Bar 
None makes similarly unfounded 
assertions, including that BBN was 
a major contributing factor to a 
26 per cent reduction in alcohol-
related incidents.191 The suggested 
link was particularly tenuous given 
the overall reduction in crime rates, 
and other related issues, was not 
formally investigated.
Some more formal investigations 
have attempted to evaluate 
voluntary schemes. A 2007 report 
by the Government Office for 
London into the effectiveness 
of BBN in Croydon concluded 
that there was “a lack of credible 
evidence” to suggest the scheme 
had an impact on the reduction 
of crime and disorder in the town 
centre. It found “an absence of 
evidence to confirm that good 
practice has been shared with 
other licensed premises in Croydon 
– BBN accredited or not”.192 
The report did highlight some 
benefits of the scheme, such as 
improved partnership working 
between different agencies, and 
acknowledged the effectiveness of 
the combination of encouragement, 
good practice, and regulatory 
enforcement associated with BBN. 
However, reflecting wider concerns 
about the lack of evaluation of 
alcohol policy the report also stated, 
“if BBN is to continue both within 
London and nationally, there is 
a real need to agree a suitable 
‘measuring tool’, which will assess 
the impact of it and provide credible 
evidence for those considering 
introducing it”.193
Recent research identified no action 
to address the issues highlighted 
by the Croydon evaluation in 2007, 
and no other formal evaluations, 
either independent or industry 
funded.194 Another recent study 
found that neither BBN nor Purple 
Flag provide more than anecdotal 
support for their actual impact and 
that while they may help stimulate 
partnership working, this is “surely 
a distraction from the development 
of the types of evaluated Multi-
Component Programmes”. 195 Such 
programs have been shown to be 
more effective.
The Leeds Metropolitan University 
document also cautions against 
being too bold in claiming impact, 
a warning that subsequent industry 
literature seems to have ignored.
Small towns and cities with the 
majority of licensed premises with 
Best Bar None Accreditation could 
“make a difference” in a collective 
sense. However, it may not be 
prudent to set over-arching targets 
and objectives, attributable to Best 
Bar None, for towns and cities that 
have 200 to 300 pubs, clubs and 
bars with only a small proportion 
with Best Bar None Accreditation; 
a small percentage of pubs/clubs 
& bars may not be able to make 
a significant/quantifiable impact 
on the overarching targets for the 
town/city.196 
Despite apparent exaggeration of 
benefits resulting from voluntary 
industry schemes, BBN does appear 
in some cases to have helped local 
coordination of licensed venues 
and licensing authorities. This has 
contributed to their popularity 
among some licensing and police 
officers. Individual case studies have 
also provided some evidence that 
voluntary schemes may assist to 
address problems to the benefit of 
local communities.197 Despite this, 
there are many examples where this 
has not been the case.198
Another voluntary scheme found 
in the UK supports establishment 
of Community Alcohol Partnerships 
(CAPs). These partnerships aim to 
address alcohol misuse and anti-
social behaviour among young 
people. While few of these have 
been evaluated, those that have 
found little impact on levels of 
anti-social behaviour despite some 
impact on public perceptions of 
the problem. Research into CAPs 
concluded that “their main role may 
be as an alcohol industry corporate 
social responsibility measure which 
is intended to limit the reputational 
damage associated with alcohol-
related ASB.”199
Lack of evidence relating to the 
effectiveness of voluntary industry 
schemes is of particular concern 
given that the Home Office has 
placed significant focus on industry 
schemes while not taking forward 
far better-evidenced policies. This 
is not to say that such schemes do 
not have a potentially useful role 
to play, but that they appear to be 
far less effective at reducing harm 
than other options within the wider 
policy toolkit. The extent to which 
such schemes are established 
is remarkable given this lack of 
supporting evidence for their 
effectiveness.
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Resource requirements/
implications
The resource requirements are 
high for most voluntary schemes, 
involving substantial commitments 
of time and money. For schemes 
such as BBN, the biggest financial 
outlay is often an annual awards 
ceremony for premises who 
participate in the scheme. Licensing 
authorities primarily carry the 
burden but this often involves 
police resources as well. Industry 
groups do seem keen to put their 
own money towards them.
Political support for policy
Voluntary schemes are politically 
attractive, due to their inclusion 
within the Modern Crime 
Prevention Strategy. This is despite 
the lack of robust evidence 
these measures are effective at 
preventing crime. Proponents 
suggest that both the regulator 
and the regulated can be seen 
to benefit from voluntary 
schemes. The awards received 
by venues may be used as tools 
for bargaining with enforcement 
agencies, and public agencies are 
able to present the impression 
that action is being taken to 
reduce alcohol-related harm.200
The licensed trade has put 
significant emphasis on voluntary 
schemes in recent years, with 
the Portman Group assisting to 
integrate various schemes and 
LIQUOR ACCORDS
LOCATION: Australia
WHAT IS IT? Voluntary agreements between businesses and licensing and compliance authorities to 
collaborate on initiatives to reduce alcohol-related harm.
POLICY SCORE: 4 on a scale of 3 to 9
PROS: • Politically feasible with support from industry stakeholders and government.
CONS: 
• Limited evidence of effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related harm.
• Relatively resource-intensive.
• Effectiveness is undermined by voluntary nature of agreements, especially in light of a 
conflict of interest between profits and social responsibility.
• Detracts from support for more effective measures.
produce additional literature and 
promotional materials. 
Policy mechanisms
As these schemes operate 
on a voluntary basis, there is 
no need for a formal policy 
mechanism. In fact, it is likely 
licensed trade would oppose 
moves to mandate participation, 
even though this would likely 
improve effectiveness. At 
present, references to such 
schemes within legislation and 
government documents provide 
them with policy foundations 
without imposing any particular 
obligations. 
Liquor accords, or their equivalent, 
were introduced in Australia in 
the early 1990s. Similar schemes 
operated in the UK under the name 
of PubWatch.201 In the Australian 
context, liquor accords are voluntary 
agreements between interested 
stakeholders who cooperate to 
develop safe and well-managed 
environments in and around 
licensed premises. Liquor accords 
may include representatives from 
licensed premises, local businesses, 
local councils, police, government 
departments, especially the 
liquor licensing body, and other 
community organisations such as 
residents’ groups. While some of 
the earliest liquor accords were 
community-driven initiatives, more 
recently police or local government 
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typically play an active role. The 
liquor licensing body often plays 
a role in providing informational 
resources, guidance, and support to 
liquor accords. Each liquor accord 
focuses on resolving local issues 
within a local area and although 
individual accords may have similar 
elements, there are no two the 
same. Liquor accords are distinct 
from Alcohol Management Plan 
(AMPs), which sometimes share 
features such as product restrictions 
or other measures to reduce alcohol 
harm but are typically enforced by 
government and local communities 
rather than business networks.202
A liquor accord might include 
measures such as:
 ● authorising or requiring a 
licensee to stop serving liquor 
on the licensed premises 
(responsible service of alcohol 
and/or banning orders)
 ● restricting the public’s access 
to the licensed premises 
(for example, by allowing 
or requiring the licensee to 
close earlier than their licence 
prescribes)
 ● prohibiting or restricting the use 
of glass containers; maintaining 
an incident register
 ● installing and operating 
closed circuit television or 
other security devices and/or 
providing security staff
 ● or charging a particular price for 
alcohol. 
However, this list does not prescribe 
the detailed ways individual liquor 
accords identify and introduce 
location-specific programs.203 It 
has been noted that while the 
essential aim of a liquor accord is 
to reduce alcohol harm, the focus 
is often on dealing with individual 
‘troublemakers’ (for example, by 
banning them from all local pubs), 
rather than on steps that might 
reduce licensees’ profits.204
By 2016, liquor accords were 
specifically mentioned in New 
South Wales, Northern Territory, 
Queensland, Victorian, and 
Western Australian liquor licensing 
legislation. At that time, there 
were more than 150 liquor 
accords in place in New South 
Wales,205 99 in Queensland,206 89 
liquor forums in Victoria (not all 
of which had an associated liquor 
accord document),207 13 in South 
Australia,208 at least two in the 
Northern Territory.209 New South 
Wales also has several precinct 
liquor accords (PLAs) in designated 
late-night entertainment precincts 
and membership of, and active 
participation in, these accords is 
mandatory for venues within the 
PLA boundary. Beyond PLAs, New 
South Wales has taken the further 
step of terminating the Kings 
Cross Precinct Liquor Accord and 
replacing it with special legislative 
provisions that apply only to the 
Kings Cross precinct.
Evidence of impact
Evaluation of three early liquor 
accords found that two had ceased 
functioning when the funding for 
project officers was not renewed. 
However, the third Geelong 
accord was still functioning at the 
end of 1996 after four years and 
had successfully contributed to 
a reduction in violent assaults.210 
Factors reported as contributing 
to its success included police 
enforcement, the level of 
commitment by the police officer 
charged with liquor licensing, 
the ongoing engagement by the 
licensees, and the lack of external 
commercial pressures from nearby 
licensees who had not signed up. 
However, a more robust follow-up 
evaluation of the Geelong accord 
(and other interventions in the 
region) concluded the accord was 
not associated with the reductions 
in alcohol-related assault or 
intoxication.211
Evaluations of other liquor accords 
show a similar inability either to 
achieve a significant reduction in 
alcohol-related harm or to ascribe 
causality of such a reduction to 
a liquor accord.212 While specific 
projects introduced under the 
auspices of a liquor accord have 
resulted in claims of harm reduction, 
no evidence is easily available to 
check the claim. Failure to conduct 
comprehensive evaluations of the 
effectiveness of liquor accords 
has been a common feature since 
their introduction, even as the 
importance of such evaluation has 
been widely accepted. It has been 
suggested that liquor accords have 
been judged successful because 
objective measures of their success 
have been expanded to factors 
other than harm reduction.213 
These have included the promotion 
of self-regulation, the improved 
perception of safety and amenity 
(even while actual crime or assault 
indicators have not shifted), the 
improved relationships between 
members of the liquor accord, 
and improved liquor licensee 
management practices.214
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Resource requirements/
implications
Until recently, the NSW Government 
had a Liquor Accord Delivery Unit 
that was committed to having 
an effective and sustainable 
network of liquor accords across 
the state and actively worked with 
licensees and local communities 
to achieve this. However, following 
a reorganisation of administrative 
responsibilities for the liquor and 
gaming sectors, the Unit ceased to 
exist (personal communication). 
A team still exists that is no longer 
dedicated to liquor accords but 
provides education and support 
to priority areas, providing services 
such as information exchange 
events and web-based resources. 
Some liquor accord groups in NSW 
operate without funding. However, 
many generate their own income 
through membership subscriptions, 
or fundraising activities to pay for 
special initiatives, such as a transport 
strategy for patrons in the holiday 
season, or a responsible drinking 
campaign. Other sources of funding 
include grants, sponsorship, and 
working with others to combine 
resources and funds.215
In Victoria, the Victorian Commission 
of Gambling and Liquor Regulation 
(VCGLR) supports liquor forums by 
providing resources, educational 
material, and regular email updates 
containing important information 
about legislation changes and new 
initiatives. This includes a bulletin 
sent to all forum chairpersons at 
the beginning of each month, 
containing news items and updates. 
The chairperson is encouraged 
to circulate the bulletin to all 
forum members and include it 
in discussions at the meetings.216 
Representatives of the VCGLR attend 
forum meetings from time to time, 
based on availability and priority.
In other states and territories, as 
for NSW and Victoria, the liquor 
licensing administrative authority 
provides support and facilitates 
the formation and maintenance 
of liquor accords. Members of the 
administrative authority may attend 
liquor accord meetings, and may 
even be a standing member of an 
accord, but this varies widely.
Political support for policy
Liquor accords are very popular. 
They meet a need arising from 
inadequate legal enforcement 
of the provisions of the liquor 
licensing legislation, and they are 
popular because they provide a 
focus for community development 
and bring communities together. 
Liquor accords are also supported 
by business because they give the 
appearance of industry engagement 
in alcohol harm reduction (despite 
being relatively ineffective in 
achieving this objective).
Policy mechanisms
As mentioned, by 2016 liquor 
accords were specifically mentioned 
in New South Wales, Northern 
Territory, Queensland, Victorian, and 
Western Australian liquor licensing 
legislation. However, legislation is 
not necessary for to establish liquor 
accords.
DISCUSSION OF ALCOHOL INDUSTRY VOLUNTARY SCHEMES
Governments in Australia and the 
UK encourage voluntary industry 
schemes to promote collaboration 
between the licensed trade and 
agencies that regulate and enforce 
laws relating to the sale of alcohol. 
The ‘Best Bar None’ scheme in the 
UK and ‘liquor accords’ in Australia 
share similar objectives and face 
similar challenges. There are also 
subtle differences in their design, 
which may provide lessons to 
inform policy development and 
achieve greater reductions in harm. 
Due to the highly competitive 
nature of the retail liquor industry, 
it has been argued that voluntary 
participation in liquor accords will 
always limit their likely effectiveness 
in reducing alcohol-related harm.217 
For this reason, voluntary programs 
that encourage members to 
participate in measures to reduce 
harm are likely less effective 
than initiatives that enforce such 
measures. One study demonstrated 
that mandatory restrictions on 
trading hours achieved greater 
reductions in the number of injuries 
presenting to hospital during high-
alcohol hours than similar measures 
under a voluntary liquor accord. 218
Industry partnerships in the UK 
and Australia have both been 
characterised by unsubstantiated 
claims for their effectiveness. For 
example, industry groups in the 
UK have attributed reductions in 
violent crime in Doncaster and 
Durham to the Best Bar None 
scheme. Evidence that participation 
in the scheme itself was a primary 
factor in the observed harm 
reduction remains tenuous. Of 
several liquor accords established 
in the 1990s, only one was believed 
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to have contributed to a reduction 
in assaults. Despite this, a more 
robust evaluation of Australian 
liquor accords found no evidence 
to support their effectiveness in 
reducing alcohol-related assaults or 
intoxication.219
Voluntary industry schemes may, 
therefore, give the appearance 
of action to reduce alcohol harm, 
and at times have some impact, 
but are considerably less effective 
than mandatory measures. They 
have the potential to detract from 
support for more effective measures 
and may represent a conflict of 
interest between business profits 
and public interest. Businesses with 
scheme membership may give the 
appearance of action to address 
alcohol harm, while simultaneously 
undermining support for more 
effective reform.
There is presently little reliable 
evidence that industry schemes 
are effective in reducing alcohol-
related harm.220 While they appear 
to be more effective in developing 
local communication networks, 
facilitating local input and a sense 
of control, they are considerably 
less effective in achieving genuine 
harm reduction.221 Industry 
accords may be successful only so 
far as assessments of success are 
extended beyond the objective of 
harm reduction.222  Since evaluations 
have been poorly designed and 
reported, a lack of evidence exists 
to support their extension to other 
regions. It could, therefore, be 
argued that the expansion of liquor 
accords should not be encouraged, 
particularly not ahead of better-
evidenced policy options.
Compared with other policies, 
which either have minimal 
resourcing requirements (such as 
the cessation of sales) or would 
generate net revenue (such as 
risk-based licensing), industry 
partnerships are resource intensive. 
Although industry groups and 
members sometimes gain funding 
through members and fundraising 
activities, governments often 
provide support as well, in the 
form of funding or sponsorship for 
educational programs and awards. 
This money could be better spent.
With respect to differences between 
schemes, a key feature of industry 
voluntary schemes in the UK that 
does not feature as prominently 
in Australian liquor accords is the 
distinctive branding used to identify 
members and promote responsible 
practices. Member businesses of 
the Best Bar None scheme, for 
example, display visible plaques 
with distinctive elements to create a 
‘kite mark’ representing responsible 
business management. While it is 
not currently the case in the UK, 
such branding could contribute 
a degree of accountability to 
Australian businesses, where 
membership status is highly visible. 
Although some jurisdictions 
provide signage that includes small 
logos identifying membership of 
a liquor accord, the branding of 
such signage and size of the logo is 
unlikely to replicate the same ‘kite 
mark’ effect.223
CONCLUSIONS
Lessons for the UK:
Given that industry schemes are relatively resource intensive and lack evidence of specific harm reduction, 
they should be deprioritised by governments in favour of evidence-based policies more likely to deliver 
meaningful reductions in alcohol-related harm.
Lessons for Australia:
Similarly, a greater focus should be placed on policies with proven effectiveness in Australia.
RECOMMENDATIONS
10. Deprioritise alcohol industry voluntary schemes
Deprioritise assistance to alcohol industry voluntary schemes, such as liquor accords, in favour of evidence-
based policies to deliver meaningful reductions in alcohol-related harm.
CONCLUSION
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This report has reviewed, compared, 
and contrasted a range of policies 
with the common objective of 
reducing alcohol-related harm 
through measures targeting the 
availability of alcohol. While some 
are more applicable to one country 
or another, there are many common 
themes between policy approaches 
in Australia and the UK. Similar 
challenges present in relation to 
off-licenced (packaged) liquor and 
on-licence venues, which require 
markedly different policy measures. 
There are also important lessons to 
be gleaned from the outcomes of 
policy approaches in each country, 
which should be used to improve 
future alcohol policies to reduce 
alcohol harm.
In England and Wales, Cumulative 
Impact Policies (CIPs) have been 
used effectively to shape the 
development of the licensed trade, 
allowing for growth in ways less 
likely to have a detrimental local 
impact. Statements of licensing 
policy (SLPs) can also be used to 
the same end. Similarly, restrictions 
on trading hours in regions of 
Australia demonstrate that enforcing 
earlier closing times can deliver 
significant reductions in alcohol-
related violence and injury. Such 
policies reduce the burden on 
public resources and facilitate the 
transformation of local economies 
to include a greater variety of 
businesses and safer environments 
for revellers, tourists, and locals.
The UK and Australia face similar 
challenges with displacement 
effects. Policies introduced in one 
location may lead to consumers 
moving to adjacent precincts, 
where regulation of trading hours 
or certain products (for example) 
is more lenient. This is a particular 
consideration in densely populated 
urban regions. Australia is likely to be 
less affected by such displacement, 
as the licensing authority typically 
has jurisdiction over a larger 
geographic area. The issue highlights 
the importance of broader state-
level or regional policies that 
minimise this risk, as all venues and 
businesses are covered by the same 
restrictions and compete on equal 
terms. 
Through selective placement of 
products, supermarkets are easily 
able to encourage consumers to 
make unintended purchases, or to 
purchase in larger quantities than 
desired. This is clearly to the benefit 
of retailers, increasing their profits, 
and the practice may not adversely 
impact consumers of some products 
other than by increasing the cost of 
their shop. However, alcohol is not 
an ordinary commodity like bread 
and milk. Encouraging customers 
to consume a greater amount of 
alcohol is clearly associated with 
negative health and social outcomes, 
in both the short and long-term.
Despite different legislative 
mechanisms, striking similarities are 
observed between the challenges 
faced in Australia and Scotland 
in incorporating health issues in 
licensing processes. Both harm 
minimisation and the public health 
objective are operationally weak, 
despite legislative provisions, and 
face similar problems defining 
and demonstrating evidence of 
what best supports public health. 
Extension of the Cardiff model in 
the UK and its proper introduction 
in Australia would aid this, although 
good data is only half the story. While 
other regions could benefit from 
the Victorian approach to evidence, 
the Western Australian practice of 
placing the onus on applicants to 
prove their venue is in the public 
interest has the greatest potential 
to strengthen the application of 
licensing across Australia and the 
UK. As Western Australian public 
interest assessments (PIA) state, “it 
is not sufficient for applicants to 
merely demonstrate that the grant 
of the application will not have 
any negative impact”.224 Instead, 
applicants must demonstrate that 
the benefits resulting from a licence 
will outweigh the negative impact of 
the heightened availability of alcohol 
in that particular location. 
Each of the licensing regimes 
covered here attempts to help 
residents take part in liquor licensing, 
to protect local communities from 
problems caused by licensed 
venues. Again, there are similar 
shared barriers and problems faced, 
including small consultation time 
periods, difficulties navigating 
the licensing process, a lack of 
independent legal advice and the 
legal influence of the licensed trade. 
The closest any area seems to have 
come to overcoming these is in 
Westminster City Council, where 
specialist legal and practical advice is 
provided for residents to help them 
make effective contributions. Similar 
schemes would be beneficial to the 
rest of the UK and Australia. 
CONCLUSION
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